Mental Content

Fall 2009

Details | Overview | Schedule [ 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 | 6 | 7 | 8 ]

Details

Overview

A reading group run in conjunction with Philosophy of Mind. We will focus on questions concerning the nature of belief, content externalism and self-knowledge, and content externalism and psychological explanation.

Schedule

Meeting One (Tuesday 15 September)

Gendler, Tamar Szabó. 2008a. “Alief and Belief”, in Journal of Philosophy, Vol. 105, No. 10, October 2008, pp. 634–663. [PDF]

Optional Reading

Gendler, Tamar Szabó. 2008b. “Alief in Action (and Reaction)”, in Mind and Language, Vol. 23, No. 5, November 2008, pp. 552–585. [PDF]

See Also

A conversation between Paul Bloom and Tamar Szabó Gendler can be seen here.

Meeting Two (Tuesday 22 September)

Fodor, Jerry A. 1978. “Propositional Attitudes”, in The Monist, Vol. 61, No. 4, October 1978, pp. 501–523.

Reprinted in Block, Ned (Ed). 1981. Readings in Philosophy of Psychology, Vol. 2, Harvard University Press, Cambridge MA, pp. 45–63; RePresentations: Philosophical Essays on the Foundations of Cognitive Science, MIT Press, Cambridge MA, 1983, pp. 177–203; Rosenthal, David M (Ed). 1991. The Nature of Mind, Oxford University Press, Oxford, pp. 325–338; and Stainton, Robert J (Ed). 2000. Perspectives in the Philosophy of Language: A Concise Anthology, Broadview, Peterborough ON, pp. 137–162.

No Meeting (Tuesday 29 September)

No Meeting (Tuesday 6 October)

Meeting Three (Tuesday 13 October)

Robert Stalnaker, “The Problem of Intentionality” [PDF] and “The Linguistic Picture”, in Inquiry, MIT Press, Cambridge MA, 1984, pp. 1–42.

Optional Reading

Field, Hartry. 1978. “Mental Representation”, in Erkenntnis, Vol. 13, No. 1, January 1978, pp. 9–61. [PDF]

Reprinted with postscript in Block, Ned (Ed). 1981. Readings in Philosophy of Psychology, Vol. 2, Harvard University Press, Cambridge MA, pp. 78–116; in Stich, Stephen, and Ted A. Warfield. 1994. Mental Representation: A Reader, Basil Blackwell, Oxford, pp. 34–78; and with an updated postscript in Truth and the Absence of Fact, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2001, pp. 30–67.

Field, Hartry. 1986. “Critical Notice: Robert Stalnaker, Inquiry”, in Philosophy of Science, Vol. 53, No. 3, November 1986, pp. 425–448. [URI]

Revised version published in Truth and the Absence of Fact, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2001, pp. 83–103.

Meeting Four (Tuesday 3 November)

McLaughlin, Brian and Michael Tye. 1998. “Externalism, Twin-Earth, and Self-Knowledge”, in Crispin Wright, Cynthia Macdonald, and Barry C. Smith (Eds), Knowing Our Own Minds, Oxford University Press, New York, pp. 285–320. [Circulated]

Optional Reading

McKinsey, Michael. 2001. “The Semantic Basis of Externalism”, in Joseph Keim Campbell, Michael O'Rourke, and David Shier (Eds), Meaning and Truth: Investigations in Philosophical Semantics, Seven Bridges Press, New York, pp. 34–52. [PDF]

Meeting Five (Tuesday 10 November)

Pryor, James. 2007. “What's Wrong With McKinsey-Style Reasoning?”, in Sanford C. Goldberg (Ed), Internalism and Externalism in Semantics and Epistemology, Oxford University Press, Oxford, pp. 177–200. [PDF]

Meeting Six (Tuesday 17 November)

Fodor, Jerry A. 1991. “A Modal Argument for Narrow Content”, in The Journal of Philosophy, Vol. 88, No. 1, January 1991, pp. 5–26. [URI]

Reprinted in Macdonald, Cynthia and Graham Macdonald (Eds), Philosophy of Psychology, Debates on Psychological Explanation, Vol. 1, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 1995.

Meeting Seven (Tuesday 1 December)

Burge, Tyler. “Reply: Intentional Properties and Causation”, in Macdonald, Cynthia and Graham Macdonald (Eds), Philosophy of Psychology, Debates on Psychological Explanation, Vol. 1, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 1995. [PDF]

Reprinted in Foundations of Mind, Philosophical Essays, Vol. 2, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2007, pp. 334–343.

Stalnaker, Robert C. 1989. “On What's In the Head”, in Philosophical Perspectives, Vol. 3, pp. 287–316. [URI]

Reprinted in Rosenthal, David M (Ed). 1991. The Nature of Mind, Oxford University Press, Oxford, pp. 576–589; Pessin, Andrew and Sanford Goldberg (Eds). 1996. The Twin Earth Chronicles: Twenty Years of Reflection on Hilary Putnam's “The Meaning of ‘Meaning’ ”, M. E. Sharpe, Armonk NY, pp. 238–260; and in Context and Content: Essays on Intentionality in Speech and Thought, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 1999, pp. 169–193.

Meeting Eight (Tuesday 8 December)

Williamson, Timothy. 2006. “Can Cognition be Factorised into Internal and External Components?”, in Robert Stainton (Ed), Contemporary Debates in Cognitive Science, Blackwell, Malden MA. [PDF]

Optional Reading

Wedgwood, Ralph. 2006. “The Internal and External Components of Cognition”, in Robert Stainton (Ed), Contemporary Debates in Cognitive Science, Blackwell, Malden MA. [URI]

The Slush Pile

Nature of Belief

Velleman, J. David. 2000. “On the Aim of Belief”, in The Possibility of Practical Reason, Oxford University Press, Oxford, pp. 244–281.

Shah, Nishi and J. David Velleman. 2005. “Doxastic Deliberation”, in Philosophical Review, Vol. 114, No. 4, October 2005, pp. 497–534.

Cummins, Robert. 1991. “Methodological Reflections on Belief”, in Radu J. Bogdan (Ed), Mind and Common Sense: Philosophical Essays on Common Sense Psychology, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, pp. 53–70.

Externalism and Psychological Explanation

Fodor, Jerry A. 1986. “Individualism and Supervenience”, in Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Supplementary Volume 60, pp. 235–262.

Reprinted in Psychosemantics: The Problem of Meaning in the Philosophy of Mind, MIT Press, Cambridge MA, 1987, pp. 27–53; and in Lycan, William G. and Jesse J. Prinz, Mind and Cognition: An Anthology, 3rd Ed, Blackwell, Malden MA, 2008.

Loar, Brian. 1988. “Social Content and Psychological Content”, in Robert H. Grimm and Daniel D. Merrill (Eds), Contents of Thought, University of Arizona Press, Tucson, pp. 99–110.

Reprinted in Rosenthal, David M (Ed). 1991. The Nature of Mind, Oxford University Press, Oxford, pp. 568–577; Pessin, Andrew and Sanford Goldberg (Eds). 1996. The Twin Earth Chronicles: Twenty Years of Reflection on Hilary Putnam's “The Meaning of ‘Meaning’ ”, M. E. Sharpe, Armonk NY, pp. 180–191; and Beakley, Brian and Peter Ludlow (Eds). 2006. The Philosophy of Mind: Classical Problems/Contemporary Issues, 2nd edition, MIT Press, Cambridge MA, pp. 623–634.

Stalnaker, Robert C. 1990. “Narrow Content”, in C. Anthony Anderson and Joseph Owens (Eds), Propositional Attitudes: The Role of Content in Logic, Language, and Mind, CSLI Publications, Stanford, pp. 131–146.

Reprinted in Context and Content: Essays on Intentionality in Speech and Thought, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 1999, pp. 194–209.

Yablo, Stephen. 1997. “Wide Causation”, in Noûs, Vol. 31, Supplement: Philosophical Perspectives, 11, Mind, Causation, and World, pp. 251–281.

Reprinted in Thoughts: Papers on Mind, Meaning, and Modality, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2009, pp. 275–306.

Updated: 6 December 2009