Philosophy of Cognitive Science

Spring 2010

From The Philosophical Magazine, Comprehending the Various Branches of Science, the Liberal and Fine Arts, Agriculture, Manufactures, and Commerce, London, 1811, Part VII, Vol VI (via here).

Details | Overview | Assessment | Reference | Reading [ 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 | 6 | 7 | 8 | 9 | 10 | 11 | Aizawa Visit | 12 | 13 | Exam | 14 | 15 | 16 | 17 | 18 | 19 | 20 | 21 | 22 | 23 | 24 | 25 | 26 | 27 ]

Details

Overview

This course is an introduction to the philosophy of cognitive science. Our focus is on philosophical issues that arise in theories of vision. It is highly recommended that students first take Philosophy of Mind, Minds and Machines, or at least one class in Brain and Cognitive Sciences. This course may be taken for upper writing level credit.

Assessment

Requirements:

• Fifteen 1–2 page reading summaries. You should pick at least one of the readings for the class in question and summarise, as clearly and concisely as you can, the main argument.
• An in class exam, consisting of multiple choice and short answer questions.
• An 8–10 page research paper, questions to be provided.

The final grade will be determined as follows:

Assessment dates:

Essay guidelines [PDF]

Reference Works

Encyclopedias
Wilson, Robert A and Frank C. Keil. 1999. MIT Encyclopedia of the Cognitive Sciences, MIT Press, Cambridge MA. [URI]

Textbooks
Botterill, George and Peter Carruthers. 1999. The Philosophy of Psychology, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge. [URI]

Dawson, Michael R. W. 1998. Understanding Cognitive Science, Blackwell, Malden MA.

Reading

Lecture One (Wednesday 13 January)

Introductory Discussion: What is Philosophy of Cognitive Science?

Lecture Two (Wednesday 20 January)

Introductory Reading
Haugeland, John. 1981. “Semantic Engines: An Introduction to Mind Design”, in Mind Design: Philosophy, Psychology, and Artificial Intelligence, MIT Press, Cambridge MA, pp. 1–34. [PDF]

Reprinted in Cummins, Robert and Denise Dellarosa Cummins (Eds). 2000. Minds, Brains, Computers: The Foundations of Cognitive Science, Blackwell, Malden MA, pp. 34–50.

Primary Reading
Marr, David. 1982. “The Philosophy and the Approach”, in Vision: A Computational Investigation into the Human Representation and Processing of Visual Information, W. H. Freeman, San Francisco, pp. 8–38. [PDF]

Reprinted in Noë, Alva and Evan T. Thompson. 2002. Vision and Mind: Selected Readings in the Philosophy of Perception, MIT Press, Cambridge MA, pp. 229–265.

Secondary Reading
Kitcher, Patricia. 1988. “Marr's Computational Theory of Vision”, in Philosophy of Science, Vol. 55, No. 1, March 1988, pp. 1–24. [URI]

Section I: Internalism and Externalism Introduced

Overview
Sterelny, Kim. 1990. “Individualism” in The Representational Theory of Mind: An Introduction, Basil Blackwell, Oxford, pp. 81–110. [PDF]

Also useful is Wilson, Robert A. 2003. “Individualism”, in Stephen Stich and Ted A. Warfield (Eds), The Blackwell Guide to Philosophy of Mind, Blackwell, Malden MA, pp. 256–287. [PDF]

Lecture Three (Monday 25 January)

Introductory Reading
Lau, Joe and Max Deutsch. 2008. “Externalism About Mental Content”, in Edward N. Zalta (Ed), Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, Stanford University, Stanford. [URI]

Primary Reading
Putnam, Hilary. 1975. “The Meaning of “Meaning” ”, in Keith Gunderson (Ed), Language, Mind, and Knowledge, Minnesota Studies in the Philosophy of Science, Vol. 7, University of Minnesota Press, Minneapolis, pp. 131–193. [PDF]

Reprinted in Putnam, Hilary. 1975. Mind, Language and Reality, Philosophical Papers, Vol. II, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, pp. 215–271; and in Pessin, Andrew and Sanford Goldberg (Eds). 1996. The Twin Earth Chronicles: Twenty Years of Reflection on Hilary Putnam's “The Meaning of ‘Meaning’ ”, M. E. Sharpe, Armonk NY, pp. 3–52.

Secondary Reading
Burge, Tyler. 1979. “Individualism and the Mental”, in Peter A. French, Jr.,Theodore E. Uehling, and Howard K. Wettstein (Eds), Studies in Metaphysics, Midwest Studies in Philosophy, Vol. 4, No. 1, University of Minnesota Press, Minneapolis, pp. 73–121. [PDF]

Reprinted in Rosenthal, David M. 1991. The Nature of Mind, Oxford University Press, Oxford, pp. 536–567; Ludlow, Peter and Norah Martin (Eds). 1998. Externalism and Self-Knowledge, CSLI Publications, Stanford, pp. 21–84; and Burge, Tyler. 2007. Foundations of Mind, Philosophical Essays, Vol. 2, Oxford University Press, Oxford, pp. 100–150.

Lecture Four (Wednesday 27 January)

Putnam and Burge, continued.

Lecture Five (Monday 1 February)

Primary Reading
Cummins, Robert. 1991. “Methodological Reflections on Belief”, in Radu J. Bogdan (Ed), Mind and Common Sense: Philosophical Essays on Common Sense Psychology, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, pp. 53–70. [PDF]

Reprinted in Cummins, Robert. 2010. The World in the Head, Oxford University Press, Oxford, pp. 67–85.

Secondary Reading
Loar, Brian. 1988. “Social Content and Psychological Content”, in Robert H. Grimm and Daniel D. Merrill (Eds), Contents of Thought, University of Arizona Press, Tucson, pp. 99–110. [PDF]

Reprinted in Rosenthal, David M (Ed). 1991. The Nature of Mind, Oxford University Press, Oxford, pp. 568–577; Pessin, Andrew and Sanford Goldberg (Eds). 1996. The Twin Earth Chronicles: Twenty Years of Reflection on Hilary Putnam's “The Meaning of ‘Meaning’ ”, M. E. Sharpe, Armonk NY, pp. 180–191; and Beakley, Brian and Peter Ludlow (Eds). 2006. The Philosophy of Mind: Classical Problems/Contemporary Issues, 2nd edition, MIT Press, Cambridge MA, pp. 623–634.

Lecture Six (Wednesday 3 February)

Primary Reading
Fodor, Jerry A. 1979. “Methodological Solipsism Considered as a Research Strategy in Cognitive Psychology”, in Behavioral and Brain Sciences, Vol. 3, No. 1, March 1979, pp. 63–73. [PDF]

Reprinted in Fodor, Jerry A. 1983. RePresentations: Philosophical Essays on the Foundations of Cognitive Science, MIT Press, Cambridge MA, pp. 225–253; Boyd, Richard, Philip Gasper, and J. D. Trout (Eds). 1991. The Philosophy of Science, MIT Press, Cambridge MA, 3rd Ed, pp. 651–670; Rosenthal, David M. 1991. The Nature of Mind, Oxford University Press, Oxford, pp. 485–498; and Beakley, Brian and Peter Ludlow (Eds). 2006. The Philosophy of Mind: Classical Problems/Contemporary Issues, MIT Press, Cambridge MA, 2nd Ed, pp. 575–596.

Excursus: Perception and Action

Lecture Seven (Monday 8 February)

Multimedia
Watch Alva Noë present an overview of his work on perception and consciousness here.

Primary Reading
Noë, Alva. 2004. “The Enactive Approach to Perception: An Introduction”, in Action in Perception, MIT Press, Cambridge MA, Chapter 1, pp. 1–34. [PDF] [Notes] [References]

Secondary Reading
Gibson, James J. 1972. “A Theory of Direct Visual Perception”, in Joseph R. Royce and William W. Rozeboom (Eds), The Psychology of Knowing, Gordon and Breach, New York, pp. 215—240. [PDF]

Reprinted in Noë, Alva and Evan T. Thompson. 2002. Vision and Mind: Selected Readings in the Philosophy of Perception, MIT Press, Cambridge MA, pp. 77–89.

Lecture Eight (Wednesday 10 February)

Primary Reading
Noë, Alva. 2004. “Pictures in Mind”, in Action in Perception, MIT Press, Cambridge MA, Chapter 2, pp. 35–73. [PDF] [Notes] [References]

Secondary Reading
Ballard, Dana H. 1991. “Animate Vision”, in Artificial Intelligence, Vol. 48, No. 1, February 1991, pp. 57–86. [PDF]

Lecture Nine (Monday 15 February)

Primary Reading
Aizawa, Kenneth. 2007. “Understanding the Embodiment of Perception”, in The Journal of Philosophy, Vol. 104, No. 1, January 2007, pp. 5–25. [PDF]

Lecture Ten (Wednesday 17 February)

Primary Reading
Aizawa, Kenneth. “Noë's Strong and Weak Enactivism”, forthcoming. [PDF]

Lecture Eleven (Monday 22 February)

Noë and Aizawa, continued.

Optional Reading
Noë, Alva. 2004. “Brain in Mind: A Conclusion”, in Action in Perception, MIT Press, Cambridge MA, Chapter 7, pp. 209–231. [PDF] [Notes] [References]

Rupert, Robert D. 2009. “Principles of Demarcation” and “Extended Cognition and Extended Experience”, in Cognitive Systems and the Extended Mind, Oxford University Press, Oxford, Chapter 2 and Chapter 8, Section 6, pp. 15–35 and 170–176. [PDF]

Aizawa Visit (Monday–Tuesday 22–23 February)

Kenneth Aizawa, Charles T. Beaird Professor of Philosophy at Centenary College, has kindly agreed to visit our class. We will be meeting for a discussion with Professor Aizawa on Monday 22 February at 6:30pm in the philosophy department.

Professor Aizawa will also be giving a public talk, “The Autonomy of Psychology in the Age of Neuroscience”, on Tuesday 23 February at 5:00pm, in the Stackel Room (Wilson Commons, 2nd floor near Harnett Gallery).

Internalism and Externalism Continued

Lecture Twelve (Wednesday 24 February)

Primary Reading
Stich, Stephen. 1976. “Autonomous Psychology and the Belief-Desire Thesis”, in The Monist, Vol. 61, No. 2, June 1976, pp. 201–227. [PDF]

Reprinted in Rosenthal, David M (Ed). 1991. The Nature of Mind, Oxford University Press, Oxford, pp. 590–600; Goldman, Alvin I (Ed). 1993. Readings in Philosophy and Cognitive Science, MIT Press, Cambridge MA, pp. 699–718; and Lycan, William G. and Jesse J. Prinz (Eds). 2008. Mind and Cognition: An Anthology, Blackwell, Malden MA, 3rd Ed.

Lecture Thirteen (Monday 1 March)

Primary Reading
Kitcher, Patricia. 1985. “Narrow Taxonomy and Wide Functionalism”, in Philosophy of Science, Vol. 52, No. 1, March 1985, pp. 78–97. [URI]

Reprinted in Boyd, Richard, Philip Gasper, and J. D. Trout (Eds). 1991. The Philosophy of Science, MIT Press, Cambridge MA, 3rd Ed, pp. 671–686.

Secondary Reading
Matthen, Mohan. 2005. “The Motor Theory of Speech Perception”, in Seeing, Doing, and Knowing: A Philosophical Theory of Sense Perception, Oxford University Press, Oxford, pp. 214–222. [PDF]

Exam (Wednesday 3 March)

Section II: Externalism and Marr's Theory of Vision

Lecture Fourteen (Monday 15 March)

Primary Reading
Burge, Tyler. 1986. “Individualism and Psychology”, in The Philosophical Review, Vol. 95, No. 1, January 1986, pp. 3–45. [URI]

Reprinted in Silvers, Stuart (Ed). 1988. ReRepresentation: Readings in the Philosophy of Mental Representation, Kluwer, Dordrecht, pp. 39–76; Boyd, Richard, Philip Gasper, and J. D. Trout (Eds). 1991. The Philosophy of Science, MIT Press, Cambridge MA, 3rd Ed, pp. 687–712; Goldman, Alvin I (Ed). 1993. Readings in Philosophy and Cognitive Science, MIT Press, Cambridge MA, pp. 719–744; and Burge, Tyler. 2007. Foundations of Mind, Philosophical Essays, Vol. 2, Oxford University Press, Oxford, pp. 221–253.

Lecture Fifteen (Wednesday 17 March)

Primary Reading
Segal, Gabriel. 1989. “Seeing What is Not There”, in The Philosophical Review, Vol. 98, No. 2, April 1989, pp. 189–214. [URI]

Lecture Sixteen (Monday 22 March)

Primary Reading
Davies, Martin. 1991. “Individualism and Perceptual Content”, in Mind, Vol. 100, No. 4, October 1991, pp. 461–484. [URI]

Secondary Reading
Segal, Gabriel. 1991. “Defence of a Reasonable Individualism”, in Mind, Vol. 100, No. 4, October 1991, pp. 485–494. [URI]

Lecture Seventeen (Wednesday 24 March)

Primary Reading
Egan, Frances. 1999. “In Defence of Narrow Mindedness”, in Mind and Language, Vol. 14, No. 2, June 1999, pp. 177–194. [URI]

Secondary Reading
Peacocke, Christopher. 1999. “Computation as Involving Content: A Response to Egan”, in Mind and Language, Vol. 14, No. 2, April 1999, pp. 195–202. [URI]

Section III: Externalism and Cognitive Ethology

Lecture Eighteen (Monday 29 March)

Primary Reading
Millikan, Ruth Garrett. 1993. “What Is Behavior? A Philosophical Essay on Ethology and Individualism in Psychology, Part 1”, in White Queen Psychology and Other Essays for Alice, MIT Press, Cambridge MA, pp. 135–150. [PDF] [References]

Secondary Reading
Sterelny, Kim. 1990. “Animals and Individualism”, in Philip P. Hanson (Ed), Information, Language and Cognition, Vancouver Studies in Cognitive Science, Vol. 1, University of British Columbia Press, Vancouver, pp. 323–339. [PDF]

Dennett, Daniel C. 1983. “Intentional Systems in Cognitive Ethology: The “Panglossian Paradigm” Defended”, in Behavioral and Brain Sciences, Vol. 6, No. 3, September 1983, pp. 343–355. [PDF]

Reprinted with postscript in The Intentional Stance, MIT Press, Cambridge MA, 1987, pp. 237–286. [Postscript PDF]

Lecture Nineteen (Wednesday 31 March)

Primary Reading
Millikan, Ruth Garrett. 1993. “The Green Grass Growing All Around: A Philosophical Essay on Ethology and Individualism in Psychology, Part 2”, in White Queen Psychology and Other Essays for Alice, MIT Press, Cambridge MA, pp. 151–170. [PDF] [References]

Lecture Twenty (Monday 5 April)

Primary Reading
Wilson, Robert A. 1994. “Causal Depth, Theoretical Appropriateness, and Individualism in Psychology”, in Philosophy of Science, Vol. 61, No. 1, March 1994, pp. 55–75. [URI]

Secondary Reading
Weslake, Brad. 2010. “Explanatory Depth”, in Philosophy of Science, Vol. 77, No. 2, April 2010, 273–294. [URI]

Potochnik, Angela. 2010. “Levels of Explanation Reconceived”, in Philosophy of Science, Vol. 77, No. 1, January 2010, pp. 59–72. [URI]

Lecture Twenty One (Wednesday 7 April)

Primary Reading
Buller, David J. 1997. “Individualism and Evolutionary Psychology (Or: In Defense of “Narrow” Functions)”, in Philosophy of Science, Vol. 64, No. 1, March 1997, pp. 74–95. [URI]

Section IV: Perceptual Content

Lecture Twenty Two (Monday 12 April)

Primary Reading
McDowell, John. 1994. “The Content of Perceptual Experience”, in The Philosophical Quarterly, Vol. 44, No. 175, April 1994, pp. 190–205. [URI]

Reprinted in McDowell, John. 1998. Mind, Value and Reality, Harvard University Press, Cambridge MA, pp. 341–358; and in Noë, Alva and Evan T. Thompson. 2002. Vision and Mind: Selected Readings in the Philosophy of Perception, MIT Press, Cambridge MA, pp. 443–458.

Secondary Reading
Bermúdez, José Luis. “Syntax, Semantics and Levels of Explanation”, in The Philosophical Quarterly, Vol. 45, No. 180, July 1995, pp. 361–367. [URI]

Lecture Twenty Three (Wednesday 14 April)

Primary Reading
Bermúdez, José Luis. 1995. “Nonconceptual Content: From Perceptual Experience to Subpersonal Computational States”, in Mind and Language, Vol. 10, No. 4, December 1995, pp. 333–369. [PDF]

Reprinted in Gunther, York H (Ed). 2003. Essays on Nonconceptual Content, MIT Press, Cambridge MA, pp. 183–216.

Lecture Twenty Four (Monday 19 April)

Primary Reading
Peacocke, Christopher. 1992. “Scenarios, Concepts and Perception”, in Tim Crane (Ed), The Contents of Experience: Essays on Perception, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, pp. 105–135. [PDF]

Reprinted in Gunther, York H (Ed). 2003. Essays on Nonconceptual Content, MIT Press, Cambridge MA, pp. 107–132.

Lecture Twenty Five (Wednesday 21 April)

Primary Reading
Bermúdez, José Luis. 1994. “Peacocke's Argument Against the Autonomy of Nonconceptual Representational Content”, in Mind and Language, Vol. 9, No. 4, December, pp. 402–418. [PDF]

Reprinted in Gunther, York H (Ed). 2003. Essays on Nonconceptual Content, MIT Press, Cambridge MA, pp. 293–307.

Secondary Reading
Peacocke, Christopher. 1994. “Non-conceptual Content: Kinds, Rationales and Relations”, in Mind and Language, Vol. 9, No. 4, December, pp. 419–430. [PDF]

Lecture Twenty Six (Monday 26 April)

Primary Reading
Schellenberg, Susanna. 2007. “Action and Self-Location in Perception”, in Mind, Vol. 116, No. 463, July 2007, pp. 603–632. [URI]

Secondary Reading
Petkova, Valeria I. and H. Henrik Ehrsson. 2008. “If I Were You: Perceptual Illusion of Body Swapping”, in PLoS ONE, Vol. 3, No. 12, e3832, 2008. [URI]

Lecture Twenty Seven (Wednesday 28 April)

Primary Reading
Briscoe, Robert. 2009. “Egocentric Spatial Representation in Action and Perception”, in Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, Vol. 79, No. 2, September 2009, pp. 423–460. [URI]

Updated: 21 April 2010