Philosophy of Science

Fall 2010

Michael Faraday's diagram of magnetic lines of force, from his “Experimental Researches in Electricity”, Philosophical Transactions of the Royal Society of London, Vol. 142, 1 January 1852, pp. 25–56.

Details | Instructor | Overview | Assessment | Reading [ 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 | 6 | 7 | 8 | 9 | 10 | 11 | 12 | 13 | 14 | 15 | 16 | 17 | 18 | 19 | 20 | 21 | 22 | 23 | 24 | 25 | 26 | 27 ]

Details

Instructor

Overview

This is a survey course in general philosophy of science, focussing on metaphysical questions concerning the nature of science. Our questions: Do scientific explanations work because they tell us about laws, or because they tell us about causes, or for some other reason? How should we understand scientific laws? Do the laws of nature govern the world or simply encapsulate some interesting patterns in the world? What is the relationship between lower level and higher level laws, and between lower level and higher level scientific theories? The course may taken for upper level writing credit.

Assessment

Requirements:

• Fifteen 1–2 page weekly reading summaries.
• Two 5–7 page research papers, questions to be provided.

The final grade will be determined as follows:

Note: Graduate students or students enrolled for upper level writing credit will be required to write longer essays. Graduate students will also be required to do additional reading and meet for an additional discussion section.

Due dates:

Paper guidelines [PDF]

Reading

Meeting One (Wednesday 1 September)

Introductory Discussion: What is Science?

No Class (Monday 6 September)

Section I: Explanation

Overview
Woodward, James. “Scientific Explanation”, in Edward N. Zalta (Ed), Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, Stanford University, Stanford, 2009. [URI]

Meeting Two (Wednesday 8 September)

Primary Reading
Hempel, Carl Gustav. 1965. “Aspects of Scientific Explanation”, in Aspects of Scientific Explanation and Other Essays in the Philosophy of Science, Free Press, New York, pp. 331–496. [PDF]

Read Sections §1–§2.

Meeting Three (Monday 13 September)

Primary Reading
Woodward, James. 2003. “Causal Explanation: Background and Criticism”, in Making Things Happen: A Theory of Causal Explanation, Oxford University Press, Oxford, pp. 152–186. [PDF]

Meeting Four (Wednesday 15 September)

Primary Reading
Lewis, David. 1986. “Causal Explanation”, in Philosophical Papers, Vol. II, Oxford University Press, Oxford, pp. 214–240. [PDF]

Secondary Reading
Woodward, James. 2003. “The Causal Mechanical and Unificationist Models of Explanation”, in Making Things Happen: A Theory of Causal Explanation, Oxford University Press, Oxford, pp. 350–373. [PDF]

Read Sections §8.1–§8.4.

Lipton, Peter. 2010. “Causation and Explanation”, in Helen Beebee, Christopher Hitchcock, and Peter Menzies (Eds), The Oxford Handbook of Causation, Oxford University Press, Oxford, pp. 619–631. [PDF]

Meeting Five (Monday 20 September)

Primary Reading
Sober, Elliott. 1983. “Equilibrium Explanation”, in Philosophical Studies, Vol. 43, No. 2, March 1983, pp. 201–210. [PDF]

Meeting Six (Wednesday 22 September)

Primary Reading
Kitcher, Philip. 1989. “Explanatory Unification and the Causal Structure of the World”, in Philip Kitcher and Wesley Salmon (Eds), Scientific Explanation, Minnesota Studies in the Philosophy of Science, Vol. 13, University of Minnesota Press, Minneapolis, pp. 410–505. [EXCERPTS PDF] [FULL PDF]

Excerpted in Balashov, Yuri and Alexander Rosenberg. 2002. Philosophy of Science: Contemporary Readings, Routledge, London, pp. 71–91. Excerpts are mandatory, full paper optional.

Meeting Seven (Monday 27 September)

Primary Reading
Woodward, James. 2003. “The Causal Mechanical and Unificationist Models of Explanation”, in Making Things Happen: A Theory of Causal Explanation, Oxford University Press, Oxford, pp. 350–373. [PDF]

Read Sections §8.5–§8.11.

Meeting Eight (Wednesday 29 September)

Primary Reading
Strevens, Michael. 2004. “The Causal and Unification Approaches to Explanation Unified—Causally”, in Noûs, Vol. 38, No. 1, March 2004, pp. 154–176. [URI]

Secondary Reading
Strevens, Michael. “The Kairetic Account of Difference-Making” and “The Kairetic Account of Explanation”, in Depth: An Account of Scientific Explanation, Harvard University Press, Cambridge MA, 2008, pp. 69–141.

Meeting Nine (Monday 4 October)

Primary Reading
Woodward, James and Hitchcock, Christopher. 2003. “Explanatory Generalizations, Part I: A Counterfactual Account”, in Noûs, Vol. 37, No. 1, March 2003, pp. 1–24. [URI]

Meeting Ten (Wednesday 6 October)

Primary Reading
Woodward, James and Hitchcock, Christopher. 2003. “Explanatory Generalizations, Part II: Plumbing Explanatory Depth”, in Noûs, Vol. 37, No. 2, June 2003, pp. 181–199. [URI]

No Class (Monday 11 October)

Meeting Eleven (Wednesday 13 October)

Primary Reading
Jackson, Frank and Philip Pettit. 1992. “In Defense of Explanatory Ecumenism”, in Economics and Philosophy, Vol. 8, No. 1, April 1992, pp. 1–21. [PDF]

Reprinted in Jackson, Frank, Philip Pettit, and Michael Smith. 2004. Mind, Morality, and Explanation: Selected Collaborations, Oxford University Press, Oxford, pp. 163–186.

Meeting Twelve (Monday 18 October)

Primary Reading
Weslake, Brad. 2010. “Explanatory Depth”, in Philosophy of Science, Vol. 77, No. 2, April 2010, pp. 273–294. [URI]

Secondary Reading
Potochnik, Angela. 2010. “Levels of Explanation Reconceived”, in Philosophy of Science, Vol. 77, No. 1, January 2010, pp. 59–72. [URI]

Section II: Laws

Overview
Carroll, John W. “Laws of Nature”, in Edward N. Zalta (Ed), Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, Stanford University, Stanford, 2006. [URI]

Meeting Thirteen (Wednesday 20 October)

Primary Reading
Cartwright, Nancy. 1994. “Fundamentalism vs. the Patchwork of Laws”, in Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Vol. 94, pp. 279–292. [URI]

Reprinted in Papineau, David (Ed). 1996. The Philosophy of Science, Oxford University Press, Oxford, pp. 314–326; and in Cartwright, Nancy. 1999. The Dappled World: A Study of the Boundaries of Science, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, pp. 23–34.

Sklar, Lawrence. 2003. “Dappled Theories in a Uniform World”, in Philosophy of Science, Vol. 70, No. 2, April 2003, pp. 424–441. [URI]

Secondary Reading
Hoefer, Carl. 2003. “For Fundamentalism”, in Philosophy of Science, Vol. 70, No. 5, December 2003, pp. 1401–1412. [URI]

Reprinted with a reply by Nancy Cartwright in Hartmann, Stephan, Carl Hoefer, and Luc Bovens (Eds). 2008. Nancy Cartwright's Philosophy of Science, Routledge, New York, pp. 307–323.

Meeting Fourteen (Monday 25 October)

Primary Reading
Psillos, Stathis. 2002. “The Regularity View of Laws”, in Causation and Explanation, McGill-Queen's University Press, Montreal, 2002, pp. 137–158. [PDF]

Read Sections §5.1–§5.5.

Meeting Fifteen (Wednesday 27 October)

Primary Reading
Psillos, Stathis. 2002. “The Regularity View of Laws”, in Causation and Explanation, McGill-Queen's University Press, Montreal, 2002, pp. 137–158. [PDF]

Read Sections §5.6–§5.7.

Secondary Reading
Loewer, Barry. 1996. “Humean Supervenience”, in Philosophical Topics, Vol. 24, No. 1, Spring 1996, pp. 101–127. [PDF]

Reprinted in Carroll, John W (Ed). 2004. Readings on Laws of Nature, University of Pittsburgh Press, Pittsburgh, pp. 176–206.

Meeting Sixteen (Monday 1 November)

Primary Reading
Callender, Craig. 2004. “Measures, Explanations and the Past: Should ‘Special’ Initial Conditions be Explained?”, in British Journal for the Philosophy of Science, Vol. 55, No. 2, pp. 195–217. [URI]

Roberts, John T. 2008. “The Law-Governed World-Picture”, in The Law-Governed Universe, Oxford University Press, Oxford, pp. 1–44. [PDF]

Read Sections §1.1–§1.6.

Secondary Reading
Hall, Ned. 2009. “Humean Reductionism About Laws of Nature”. [PDF]

Meeting Seventeen (Wednesday 3 November)

Primary Reading
Carroll, John W. 1990. “The Humean Tradition”, in The Philosophical Review, Vol. 99, No. 2, April 1990, pp. 185–219. [URI]

Secondary Reading
Lange, Marc. 2005. “Laws and Their Stability”, in Synthese, Vol. 144, No. 3, April 2005, pp. 415–432. [URI]

Meeting Eighteen (Monday 8 November)

Primary Reading
Beebee, Helen. 2000. “The Non-Governing Conception of Laws of Nature”, in Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, Vol. 61, No. 3, November 2000, pp. 571–594. [URI]

Reprinted in Carroll, John W (Ed). 2004. Readings on Laws of Nature, University of Pittsburgh Press, Pittsburgh, pp. 250–276.

Meeting Nineteen (Wednesday 10 November)

Primary Reading
Maudlin, Tim. 2007. “A Modest Proposal Concerning Laws, Counterfactuals, and Explanations”, in The Metaphysics Within Physics, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2007, pp. 5–49. [PDF]

Secondary Reading
Ward, Barry. 2007. “Laws, Explanation, Governing, and Generation”, in Australasian Journal of Philosophy, Vol. 85, No. 4, December 2007, pp. 537–552. [URI]

Meeting Twenty (Monday 15 November)

Primary Reading
Earman, John and John T. Roberts. 2005. “Contact with the Nomic: A Challenge for Deniers of Humean Supervenience about Laws of Nature Part II: The Epistemological Argument for Humean Supervenience”, in Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, Vol. 71, No. 2, September 2005, pp. 253–286. [URI]

Section III: Non-Fundamental Laws and Explanation

Overview
Hamilton, Andrew. 2007. “Laws of Biology, Laws of Nature: Problems and (Dis)Solutions”, in Philosophy Compass, Vol. 2, No. 3, May 2007, pp. 592–610. [URI]

Meeting Twenty One (Wednesday 17 November)

Primary Reading
Fodor, Jerry A. 1974. “Special Sciences (Or: The Disunity of Science as a Working Hypothesis)”, in Synthese, Vol. 28, No. 2, October 1974, pp. 97–115. [PDF]

Reprinted in Ned Block (Ed), Readings in Philosophy of Psychology, Harvard University Press, Cambridge MA, 1980, Vol. 1, pp. 120–133; Jerry A. Fodor, RePresentations: Philosophical Essays on the Foundations of Cognitive Science, MIT Press, Cambridge MA, 1983, pp. 127–145; Paul K. Moser and J. D. Trout (Eds), Contemporary Materialism: A Reader, Routledge, London, 1995, pp. 53–67; and Mark A. Bedau and Paul Humphreys (Eds), Emergence: Contemporary Readings in Philosophy And Science, MIT Press, Cambridge MA, 2008, pp. 395–410.

Meeting Twenty Two (Monday 22 November)

Primary Reading
Kim, Jaegwon. 1992. “Multiple Realization and the Metaphysics of Reduction”, in Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, Vol. 52, No. 1, March 1992, pp. 1–26. [URI]

Secondary Reading
Fodor, Jerry A. 1997. “Special Sciences: Still Autonomous After All These Years”, in Noûs, Vol. 31, Supplement: Philosophical Perspectives, Vol. 11: Mind, Causation, and World, pp. 149—163. [URI]

No Class (Wednesday 24 November)

Meeting Twenty Three (Monday 29 November)

Primary Reading
Loewer, Barry. 2009. “Why is There Anything Except Physics?”, in Synthese, Vol. 170, No. 2, September 2009, pp. 217–233. [URI]

Loewer, Barry. 2008. “Why There Is Anything Except Physics”, in Jesper Kallestrup and Jakob Hohwy (Eds) Being Reduced: New Essays on Reduction, Explanation and Causation, Oxford University Press, Oxford, pp. 149–163. [PDF]

Secondary Reading
Callender, Craig. 1997. “What Is ‘The Problem of the Direction of Time’?”, in Philosophy of Science, Vol. 64, Supplement, Proceedings of the 1996 Biennial Meetings of the Philosophy of Science Association Part II: Symposia Papers, December 1997, pp. S223–S234. [URI]

Meeting Twenty Four (Wednesday 1 December)

Primary Reading
Callender, Craig and Jonathan Cohen. “Special Sciences, Conspiracy and the Better Best System Account of Lawhood”, forthcoming in Erkenntnis. [PDF]

Secondary Reading
Callender, Craig and Jonathan Cohen. 2009. “A Better Best System Theory of Lawhood”, in Philosophical Studies, Vol. 145, No. 1, pp. 1–34. [URI]

Mathias Frisch, “From Arbuthnot to Boltzmann: The Past-hypothesis, the Best System, and the Special Sciences”. [PDF]

Meeting Twenty Five (Monday 6 December)

Primary Reading
Strevens, Michael. 2008. “Physically Contingent Laws and Counterfactual Support”, in Philosophers' Imprint, Vol. 8, No. 8, August 2008, pp. 1–20. [URI]

Secondary Reading
Hall, Ned. 2005. “Causation and Ceteris Paribus Laws”, in The Harvard Review of Philosophy, Vol. 13, No. 1, Spring 2005, pp. 80–99. [PDF]

Meeting Twenty Six (Wednesday 8 December)

Primary Reading
Lange, Marc. 2002. “Who's Afraid of Ceteris-Paribus Laws? Or: How I Learned to Stop Worrying and Love Them”, in Erkenntnis, Vol. 57, No. 3, November 2002, pp. 407–423. [URI]

Reprinted in Earman, John, Clark Glymour, and Sandra Mitchell (Eds). 2003. Ceteris Paribus Laws, Kluwer, Dordrecht, pp. 131–147.

Meeting Twenty Seven (Monday 13 December)

Primary Reading
Woodward, James. 2002. “There is No Such Thing as a Ceteris Paribus Law”, in Erkenntnis, Vol. 57, No. 3, November 2002, pp. 303–328. [URI]

Reprinted in Earman, John, Clark Glymour, and Sandra Mitchell (Eds). 2003. Ceteris Paribus Laws, Kluwer, Dordrecht, pp. 27–52.

Updated: 28 November 2010