Fall 2012

Overview

This is a graduate seminar on causation, with a focus on regularity theories, counterfactual theories, and the relationship between higher and lower level causes. The schedule is tentative, and may be changed as the course progresses. Unless otherwise advertised, we meet in the Philosophy Seminar Room (Lattimore 531) at 2:00pm–4:40pm. A BibTeX file containing all the references below can be found here.

Schedule

Background Readings on Methodology

Primary

• Dowe, Phil. 2000. Physical Causation, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, Chapter 1.
• Hall, Ned. 2006. “Philosophy of Causation: Blind Alleys Exposed; Promising Directions Highlighted”, in Philosophy Compass, Vol. 1, No. 1, January, pp. 86–94. URI: http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1747-9991.2006.00002.x.

Secondary

• Hall, Ned and Paul, L. A. forthcoming. Causation: A User’s Guide, Oxford University Press, Oxford, Chapter 1, §§1–2 and Chapter 2, §§3.1–3.2.
• Bontly, Thomas D. 2006. “What is an Empirical Analysis of Causation?”, in Synthese, Vol. 151, No. 2, July, pp. 177–200. URI: http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s11229-004-2470-8
• Rose, David and Danks, David. 2012. “Causation: Empirical Trends and Future Directions”, in Philosophy Compass, Vol. 7, No. 9, September, pp. 643–653. URI: http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1747-9991.2012.00503.x

Regularity Theories: Hume (Monday 10 September)

Primary

• Hume, Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding, §§4–7.
• Hausman, Daniel M. 1998. Causal Asymmetries, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, Chapter 3.

Secondary

• Mackie, John L. 1974. The Cement of the Universe: A Study of Causation, Oxford University Press, Oxford, Chapter 1.

Regularity Theories: Mackie (Monday 17 September)

Primary

• Mackie, John L. 1974. The Cement of the Universe: A Study of Causation, Oxford University Press, Oxford, Chapters 3 and 8.

Secondary

• Scriven, Michael. [1966] 1993. “Defects of the Necessary Condition Analysis of Causation”, in Sosa and Tooley (Ed), Causation, Oxford University Press, Oxford, pp. 56–59.
• Kim, Jaegwon. 1971. “Causes and Events: Mackie on Causation”, in Journal of Philosophy, Vol. 68, No. 14, pp. 426–441.

Regularity Theories: Strevens (Monday 24 September)

Primary

• Strevens, Michael. 2007. “Mackie Remixed”, in Campbell, O’Rourke and Silverstein (Ed), Causation and Explanation, MIT Press, Cambridge MA, Vol. 4, pp. 93–118.

Secondary

• Strevens, Michael. 2008. “Event Explanation and Causal Claims”, in Depth: An Account of Scientific Explanation, Harvard University Press, Cambridge MA, pp. 181–216.
• Maslen, Cei. forthcoming. “Regularity Accounts of Causation and the Problem of Pre-emption: Dark Prospects Indeed”, in Erkenntnis. URI: http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s10670-012-9399-y.

Counterfactual Theories: Lewis I (Monday 1 October)

Introductory

• Menzies, Peter. 2008. “Counterfactual Theories of Causation”, in Zalta (Ed), Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, Stanford University, Stanford. URI: http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/causation-counterfactual/

Primary

• Lewis, David. 1973. “Causation”, in The Journal of Philosophy, Vol. 70, No. 17, October, pp. 556–567. URI: http://dx.doi.org/10.2307/2025310
• Lewis, David. 1986. “Postscripts to "Causation"”, in Philosophical Papers, Oxford University Press, Oxford, Vol. II, pp. 172–213

Secondary

• Collins, John and Hall, Ned and Paul, L. A. 2004. “Counterfactuals and Causation: History, Problems, and Prospects”, in Collins, Hall and Paul (Ed), Counterfactuals and Causation, MIT Press, Cambridge MA, pp. 1–58.

Counterfactual Theories: Lewis II (Monday 15 October)

Primary

• Lewis, David. 1979. “Counterfactual Dependence and Time’s Arrow”, in Noûs, Vol. 13, No. 4, November, pp. 455–476. URI: http://dx.doi.org/10.2307/2215339.
• Lewis, David. 1986. “Postscripts to "Counterfactual Dependence and Time’s Arrow"”, in Philosophical Papers, Oxford University Press, Oxford, Vol. II, pp. 52–66.

Secondary

• Elga, Adam. 2000. “Statistical Mechanics and the Asymmetry of Counterfactual Dependence”, in Philosophy of Science, Vol. 68, No. 3, September, pp. S313-S324. URI: http://dx.doi.org/10.1086/392918.
• Price, Huw and Weslake, Brad. 2010. “The Time-Asymmetry of Causation”, in Beebee, Hitchcock and Menzies (Ed), The Oxford Handbook of Causation, Oxford University Press, Oxford, pp. 414–443.

Counterfactual Theories: Causal Models I (Monday 22 October)

Primary

• Woodward, James. 2003. Making Things Happen: A Theory of Causal Explanation, Oxford University Press, New York, Chapters 1–2.

Secondary

• Hitchcock, Christopher. 2001. “The Intransitivity of Causation Revealed in Equations and Graphs”, in The Journal of Philosophy, Vol. 98, No. 6, June, pp. 273–299

Counterfactual Theories: Causal Models II (Monday 29 October)

Primary

• Weslake, Brad. ms. “A Partial Theory of Actual Causation”. Unpublished manuscript. URI: http://philpapers.org/rec/wesapt

Secondary

• Halpern, Joseph Y. and Pearl, Judea. 2005. “Causes and Explanations: A Structural-Model Approach. Part I: Causes”, in British Journal for the Philosophy of Science, Vol. 56, No. 4, December, pp. 843–887. URI: http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/bjps/axi147
• Livengood, Jonathan. forthcoming. “Actual Causation and Simple Voting Scenarios”, in Noûs. URI: http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1468-0068.2011.00834.x

Counterfactual Theories: Causal Models III (Monday 5 November)

Primary

• Menzies, Peter. 2007. “Causation in Context”, in Price and Corry (Ed), Causation, Physics and the Constitution of Reality: Russell’s Republic Revisited, Oxford University Press, Oxford, pp. 191–223.

Secondary

• Halpern, Joseph Y. and Hitchcock, Christopher. 2011. “Graded Causation and Defaults”, March. Unpublished manuscript..
• Hitchcock, Christopher. 2007. “Prevention, Preemption, and the Principle of Sufficient Reason”, in Philosophical Review, Vol. 116, No. 4, October, pp. 495–532. URI: http://dx.doi.org/10.1215/00318108-2007-012.
• Maudlin, Tim. 2004. “Causation, Counterfactuals, and the Third Factor”, in Collins, Hall and Paul (Ed), Counterfactuals and Causation, MIT Press, Cambridge MA, pp. 419–443.
• Menzies, Peter. 2004. “Causal Models, Token Causation, and Processes”, in Philosophy of Science, Vol. 71, No. 5, December, pp. 820–832. URI: http://dx.doi.org/10.1086/425057. Expanded version available as a preprint at http://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/1039/.

Two Concepts of Causation I (Monday 12 November)

Primary

• Hall, Ned. 2004. “Two Concepts of Causation”, in Collins, Hall and Paul (Ed), Counterfactuals and Causation, MIT Press, Cambridge MA, pp. 225–276.

Secondary

• Hall, Ned. 2006. “The Intrinsic Character of Causation”, in Zimmerman (Ed), Oxford Studies in Metaphysics, Oxford University Press, Oxford, Vol. 2, pp. 255–299.
• Godfrey-Smith, Peter. 2010. “Causal Pluralism”, in Beebee, Hitchcock and Menzies (Ed), The Oxford Handbook of Causation, Oxford University Press, Oxford, pp. 326–337.

Two Concepts of Causation II (Monday 19 November)

Primary

• Ney, Alyssa. 2009. “Physical Causation and Difference-Making”, in The British Journal for the Philosophy of Science, Vol. 60, No. 4, December, pp. 737–764. URI: http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/bjps/axp037
• Glynn, Luke. forthcoming. “Causal Foundationalism, Physical Causation, and Difference-Making”, in Synthese. URI: http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s11229-011-0058-7

Secondary

• Kment, Boris. 2010. “Causation: Determination and Difference-Making”, in Noûs, Vol. 44, No. 1, March, pp. 80–111. URI: http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1468-0068.2009.00732.x

Levels of Causation I (Monday 26 November)

Primary

• Kim, Jaegwon. 1998. Mind in a Physical World: An Essay on the Mind-Body Problem and Mental Causation, MIT Press, Cambridge MA, selections from Chapters 1, 2 and 3.

Secondary

• Loewer, Barry. 2001. “Review of Mind in a Physical World: An Essay on the Mind-Body Problem and Mental Causation”, in The Journal of Philosophy, Vol. 98, No. 6, June, pp. 315–324.
• Bennett, Karen. 2003. “Why the Exclusion Problem Seems Intractable, and How, Just Maybe, To Tract It”, in Noûs, Vol. 37, No. 3, September, pp. 471–497. URI: http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/1468-0068.00447

Levels of Causation II (Monday 3 December)

Primary

• Shapiro, Lawrence A. and Sober, Elliott. 2007. “Epiphenomenalism—The Do’s and the Don’ts”, in Machamer and Wolters (Ed), Thinking about Causes: From Greek Philosophy to Modern Physics, University of Pittsburgh Press, Pittsburgh, pp. 235–264.

Secondary

• Baumgartner, Michael. 2010. “Interventionism and Epiphenomenalism”, in Canadian Journal of Philosophy, Vol. 40, No. 3, September, pp. 359–383.
• Weslake, Brad. ms. “Exclusion Excluded”. Unpublished manuscript. URI: http://philpapers.org/rec/wesee.
• Woodward, James. 2008. “Mental Causation and Neural Mechanisms”, in Kallestrup and Hohwy (Ed), Being Reduced: New Essays on Reduction, Explanation and Causation, Oxford University Press, Oxford, pp. 218–262.

Levels of Causation III (Monday 10 December)

Primary

• List, Christian and Menzies, Peter. 2009. “Nonreductive Physicalism and the Limits of the Exclusion Principle”, in Journal of Philosophy, Vol. 106, No. 9, September, pp. 475–502.

Secondary

• Shapiro, Lawrence A. forthcoming. “Mental Manipulations and the Problem of Causal Exclusion”, in Australasian Journal of Philosophy. URI: http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/00048402.2011.601749
• Weslake, Brad. forthcoming. “Difference-Making, Closure and Exclusion”, in Beebee, Hitchcock and Price (Ed), Making a Difference, Oxford University Press, Oxford.