Philosophy of Science

Fall 2012


From Michael Faraday, Experimental Researches in Electricity

Michael Faraday's diagram of magnetic lines of force, from his “Experimental Researches in Electricity”, Philosophical Transactions of the Royal Society of London, Vol. 142, 1 January 1852, pp. 25–56.

Details | Instructor | Overview | Assessment | Schedule [ 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 | 6 | 7 | 8 | 9 | 10 | 11 | 12 | 13 | 14 | 15 | 16 | 17 | 18 | 19 | 20 | 21 | 22 | 23 | 24 | 25 | 26 | 27 ]

Details

Course CodesLocation Times
PHL 252, PHL 252W, PHL 452Morey Hall 502Mondays and Wednesdays, 12:30pm to 1:45pm

Instructor

NameEmailOfficeConsultation Times
Brad Weslakebradley.weslake@rochester.edu520 Lattimore HallWednesdays, 2PM–3PM

Overview

This is a survey course in general philosophy of science, focussing on metaphysical questions concerning the nature of science. Our questions: Do scientific explanations work because they tell us about laws, or because they tell us about causes, or for some other reason? How should we understand scientific laws? Do the laws of nature govern the world or simply encapsulate some interesting patterns in the world? What is the relationship between lower level and higher level laws, and between lower level and higher level scientific theories? The course may taken for upper level writing credit.

Assessment

Requirements:

The final grade will be determined approximately as follows:

Reading Summaries: 15%
First Research Paper: 35%
Second Research Paper: 50%

Note: Graduate students or students enrolled for upper level writing credit will be required to write longer essays. Graduate students will also be required to do additional reading and meet for an additional discussion section.

Due dates:

Reading Summaries: At each associated class, with no exceptions
First Paper: Wednesday 24 OctoberQuestions [PDF]
Second Paper: Monday 17 DecemberQuestions [PDF]

Paper guidelines [PDF]

Schedule

Introductory Discussion (Wednesday 5 September)

Section I: Explanation

Overview

Woodward, James. “Scientific Explanation”, in Edward N. Zalta (Ed), Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, Stanford University, Stanford, 2009. [URI]

Meeting Two (Monday 10 September)

Primary

Hempel, Carl Gustav. 1965. “Aspects of Scientific Explanation”, in Aspects of Scientific Explanation and Other Essays in the Philosophy of Science, Free Press, New York, pp. 331–496. [PDF]

Read Sections §1–§2.

Meeting Three (Wednesday 12 September)

Primary

Woodward, James. 2003. “Causal Explanation: Background and Criticism”, in Making Things Happen: A Theory of Causal Explanation, Oxford University Press, Oxford, pp. 152–186. [PDF]

Meeting Four (Monday 17 September)

Primary

Lewis, David. 1986. “Causal Explanation”, in Philosophical Papers, Vol. II, Oxford University Press, Oxford, pp. 214–240. [PDF]

Secondary

Woodward, James. 2003. “The Causal Mechanical and Unificationist Models of Explanation”, in Making Things Happen: A Theory of Causal Explanation, Oxford University Press, Oxford, pp. 350–373. [PDF]

Read Sections §8.1–§8.4.

Meeting Five (Wednesday 19 September)

Primary

Sober, Elliott. 1983. “Equilibrium Explanation”, in Philosophical Studies, Vol. 43, No. 2, March 1983, pp. 201–210. [PDF]

Meeting Six (Monday 24 September)

Primary

Kitcher, Philip. 1989. “Explanatory Unification and the Causal Structure of the World”, in Philip Kitcher and Wesley Salmon (Eds), Scientific Explanation, Minnesota Studies in the Philosophy of Science, Vol. 13, University of Minnesota Press, Minneapolis, pp. 410–505. [EXCERPTS PDF] [FULL PDF]

Excerpted in Balashov, Yuri and Alexander Rosenberg. 2002. Philosophy of Science: Contemporary Readings, Routledge, London, pp. 71–91. Excerpts are mandatory, full paper optional.

Meeting Seven (Wednesday 26 September)

Primary

Woodward, James. 2003. “The Causal Mechanical and Unificationist Models of Explanation”, in Making Things Happen: A Theory of Causal Explanation, Oxford University Press, Oxford, pp. 350–373. [PDF]

Read Sections §8.5–§8.11.

Meeting Eight (Monday 1 October)

Primary

Strevens, Michael. 2004. “The Causal and Unification Approaches to Explanation Unified—Causally”, in Noûs, Vol. 38, No. 1, March 2004, pp. 154–176. [URI]

Secondary

Strevens, Michael. “The Kairetic Account of Difference-Making” and “The Kairetic Account of Explanation”, in Depth: An Account of Scientific Explanation, Harvard University Press, Cambridge MA, 2008, pp. 69–141.

Meeting Nine (Wednesday 3 October)

Primary

Woodward, James and Hitchcock, Christopher. 2003. “Explanatory Generalizations, Part I: A Counterfactual Account”, in Noûs, Vol. 37, No. 1, March 2003, pp. 1–24. [URI]

No Class (Monday 8 October)

Meeting Ten (Wednesday 10 October)

Primary

Woodward, James and Hitchcock, Christopher. 2003. “Explanatory Generalizations, Part II: Plumbing Explanatory Depth”, in Noûs, Vol. 37, No. 2, June 2003, pp. 181–199. [URI]

Meeting Eleven (Monday 15 October)

Primary

Jackson, Frank and Philip Pettit. 1992. “In Defense of Explanatory Ecumenism”, in Economics and Philosophy, Vol. 8, No. 1, April 1992, pp. 1–21. [PDF]

Reprinted in Jackson, Frank, Philip Pettit, and Michael Smith. 2004. Mind, Morality, and Explanation: Selected Collaborations, Oxford University Press, Oxford, pp. 163–186.

Meeting Twelve (Wednesday 17 October)

Primary

Weslake, Brad. 2010. “Explanatory Depth”, in Philosophy of Science, Vol. 77, No. 2, April 2010, pp. 273–294. [URI]

Secondary

Potochnik, Angela. 2010. “Levels of Explanation Reconceived”, in Philosophy of Science, Vol. 77, No. 1, January 2010, pp. 59–72. [URI]

Section II: Laws

Overview

Carroll, John W. “Laws of Nature”, in Edward N. Zalta (Ed), Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, Stanford University, Stanford, 2006. [URI]

Meeting Thirteen (Monday 22 October)

Primary

Cartwright, Nancy. 1994. “Fundamentalism vs. the Patchwork of Laws”, in Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Vol. 94, pp. 279–292. [URI]

Reprinted in Papineau, David (Ed). 1996. The Philosophy of Science, Oxford University Press, Oxford, pp. 314–326; and in Cartwright, Nancy. 1999. The Dappled World: A Study of the Boundaries of Science, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, pp. 23–34.

Sklar, Lawrence. 2003. “Dappled Theories in a Uniform World”, in Philosophy of Science, Vol. 70, No. 2, April 2003, pp. 424–441. [URI]

Secondary

Hoefer, Carl. 2003. “For Fundamentalism”, in Philosophy of Science, Vol. 70, No. 5, December 2003, pp. 1401–1412. [URI]

Reprinted with a reply by Nancy Cartwright in Hartmann, Stephan, Carl Hoefer, and Luc Bovens (Eds). 2008. Nancy Cartwright's Philosophy of Science, Routledge, New York, pp. 307–323.

Meeting Fourteen (Wednesday 24 October)

Primary

Psillos, Stathis. 2002. “The Regularity View of Laws”, in Causation and Explanation, McGill-Queen's University Press, Montreal, 2002, pp. 137–158. [PDF]

Read Sections §5.1–§5.5.
Secondary

Roberts, John T. 2008. “The Law-Governed World-Picture”, in The Law-Governed Universe, Oxford University Press, Oxford, pp. 1–44. [PDF]

Read Sections §1.1–§1.6.

Meeting Fifteen (Monday 29 October)

Primary

Psillos, Stathis. 2002. “The Regularity View of Laws”, in Causation and Explanation, McGill-Queen's University Press, Montreal, 2002, pp. 137–158. [PDF]

Read Sections §5.6–§5.7.
Secondary

Loewer, Barry. 1996. “Humean Supervenience”, in Philosophical Topics, Vol. 24, No. 1, Spring 1996, pp. 101–127. [PDF]

Reprinted in Carroll, John W (Ed). 2004. Readings on Laws of Nature, University of Pittsburgh Press, Pittsburgh, pp. 176–206.

Meeting Sixteen (Wednesday 31 October)

Primary

Psillos, Stathis. 2002. “Laws as Relations Among Universals”, in Causation and Explanation, McGill-Queen's University Press, Montreal, 2002, pp. 159–177. [PDF]

Meeting Seventeen (Monday 5 November)

Primary

Carroll, John W. 1990. “The Humean Tradition”, in The Philosophical Review, Vol. 99, No. 2, April 1990, pp. 185–219. [URI]

Secondary

Lange, Marc. 2005. “Laws and Their Stability”, in Synthese, Vol. 144, No. 3, April 2005, pp. 415–432. [URI]

Meeting Eighteen (Wednesday 7 November)

Primary

Beebee, Helen. 2000. “The Non-Governing Conception of Laws of Nature”, in Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, Vol. 61, No. 3, November 2000, pp. 571–594. [URI]

Reprinted in Carroll, John W (Ed). 2004. Readings on Laws of Nature, University of Pittsburgh Press, Pittsburgh, pp. 250–276.

Meeting Nineteen (Monday 12 November)

Primary

Maudlin, Tim. 2007. “A Modest Proposal Concerning Laws, Counterfactuals, and Explanations”, in The Metaphysics Within Physics, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2007, pp. 5–49. [PDF]

Secondary

Ward, Barry. 2007. “Laws, Explanation, Governing, and Generation”, in Australasian Journal of Philosophy, Vol. 85, No. 4, December 2007, pp. 537–552. [URI]

Meeting Twenty (Wednesday 14 November)

Primary

Earman, John and John T. Roberts. 2005. “Contact with the Nomic: A Challenge for Deniers of Humean Supervenience about Laws of Nature Part II: The Epistemological Argument for Humean Supervenience”, in Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, Vol. 71, No. 2, September 2005, pp. 253–286. [URI]

Section III: Non-Fundamental Laws and Explanation

Overview

Hamilton, Andrew. 2007. “Laws of Biology, Laws of Nature: Problems and (Dis)Solutions”, in Philosophy Compass, Vol. 2, No. 3, May 2007, pp. 592–610. [URI]

Meeting Twenty One (Monday 19 November)

Primary

Fodor, Jerry A. 1974. “Special Sciences (Or: The Disunity of Science as a Working Hypothesis)”, in Synthese, Vol. 28, No. 2, October 1974, pp. 97–115. [PDF]

Reprinted in Ned Block (Ed), Readings in Philosophy of Psychology, Harvard University Press, Cambridge MA, 1980, Vol. 1, pp. 120–133; Jerry A. Fodor, RePresentations: Philosophical Essays on the Foundations of Cognitive Science, MIT Press, Cambridge MA, 1983, pp. 127–145; Paul K. Moser and J. D. Trout (Eds), Contemporary Materialism: A Reader, Routledge, London, 1995, pp. 53–67; and Mark A. Bedau and Paul Humphreys (Eds), Emergence: Contemporary Readings in Philosophy And Science, MIT Press, Cambridge MA, 2008, pp. 395–410.

No Class (Wednesday 21 November)

Meeting Twenty Two (Monday 26 November)

Primary

Kim, Jaegwon. 1992. “Multiple Realization and the Metaphysics of Reduction”, in Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, Vol. 52, No. 1, March 1992, pp. 1–26. [URI]

Secondary

Fodor, Jerry A. 1997. “Special Sciences: Still Autonomous After All These Years”, in Noûs, Vol. 31, Supplement: Philosophical Perspectives, Vol. 11: Mind, Causation, and World, pp. 149—163. [URI]

Meeting Twenty Three (Wednesday 28 November)

Primary

Loewer, Barry. 2009. “Why is There Anything Except Physics?”, in Synthese, Vol. 170, No. 2, September 2009, pp. 217–233. [URI]

Loewer, Barry. 2008. “Why There Is Anything Except Physics”, in Jesper Kallestrup and Jakob Hohwy (Eds) Being Reduced: New Essays on Reduction, Explanation and Causation, Oxford University Press, Oxford, pp. 149–163. [PDF]

Secondary

Callender, Craig. 1997. “What Is ‘The Problem of the Direction of Time’?”, in Philosophy of Science, Vol. 64, Supplement, Proceedings of the 1996 Biennial Meetings of the Philosophy of Science Association Part II: Symposia Papers, December 1997, pp. S223–S234. [URI]

Meeting Twenty Four (Monday 3 December)

Primary

Callender, Craig and Jonathan Cohen. “Special Sciences, Conspiracy and the Better Best System Account of Lawhood”, forthcoming in Erkenntnis. [PDF]

Secondary

Callender, Craig and Jonathan Cohen. 2009. “A Better Best System Theory of Lawhood”, in Philosophical Studies, Vol. 145, No. 1, pp. 1–34. [URI]

Mathias Frisch, “From Arbuthnot to Boltzmann: The Past-hypothesis, the Best System, and the Special Sciences”. [PDF]

Meeting Twenty Five (Wednesday 5 December)

Primary

Strevens, Michael. 2008. “Physically Contingent Laws and Counterfactual Support”, in Philosophers' Imprint, Vol. 8, No. 8, August 2008, pp. 1–20. [URI]

Secondary

Hall, Ned. 2005. “Causation and Ceteris Paribus Laws”, in The Harvard Review of Philosophy, Vol. 13, No. 1, Spring 2005, pp. 80–99. [PDF]

Meeting Twenty Six (Monday 10 December)

Primary

Lange, Marc. 2002. “Who's Afraid of Ceteris-Paribus Laws? Or: How I Learned to Stop Worrying and Love Them”, in Erkenntnis, Vol. 57, No. 3, November 2002, pp. 407–423. [URI]

Reprinted in Earman, John, Clark Glymour, and Sandra Mitchell (Eds). 2003. Ceteris Paribus Laws, Kluwer, Dordrecht, pp. 131–147.

Meeting Twenty Seven (Wednesday 12 December)

Primary

Woodward, James. 2002. “There is No Such Thing as a Ceteris Paribus Law”, in Erkenntnis, Vol. 57, No. 3, November 2002, pp. 303–328. [URI]

Reprinted in Earman, John, Clark Glymour, and Sandra Mitchell (Eds). 2003. Ceteris Paribus Laws, Kluwer, Dordrecht, pp. 27–52.

Updated: 22 November 2012