Fall 2012

Overview

This is a graduate-level reading group in philosophy of science, aiming at breadth rather than depth. The reading list will evolve as the course progresses. A BibTeX file containing all the references below can be found here. Unless otherwise advertised, we meet in my office, 520 Lattimore Hall, at 4pm–5pm.

Schedule

Wednesday 19 September

• Beebee, Helen. 2011. “Necessary Connections and the Problem of Induction”, in Noûs, Vol. 45, No. 3, pp. 504–527. URI: http://goo.gl/9rjAZ

Wednesday 26 September

• Railton, Peter. 1981. “Probability, Explanation, and Information”, in Synthese, Vol. 48, No. 2, August, pp. 233–256. URI: http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/BF01063889

Tuesday 9 October, 3pm–5pm.

• Roush, Sherrilyn. 2005. “Real Anti-realism: The Evidential Approach”, in Tracking Truth: Knowledge, Evidence, and Science, Oxford University Press, Oxford, pp. 189–224. [PDF]

Wednesday 17 October

• Roush continued.

Wednesday 24 October

• Stanford, P. Kyle. 2009. “Scientific Realism, the Atomic Theory, and the Catch-All Hypothesis: Can We Test Fundamental Theories Against All Serious Alternatives?”, in British Journal for the Philosophy of Science, Vol. 60, No. 2, June, pp. 253–269. URI: http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/bjps/axp003

Wednesday 31 October

• Lewis, Peter J. 2001. “Why The Pessimistic Induction Is A Fallacy”, in Synthese, Vol. 129, No. 3, December, pp. 371–380. URI: http://dx.doi.org/10.1023/A:1013139410613
• Saatsi, Juha T. 2005. “On the Pessimistic Induction and Two Fallacies”, in Philosophy of Science, Vol. 72, No. 5, December, pp. 1088–1098. URI: http://dx.doi.org/10.1086/508959

Wednesday 7 November

• Stanford, P. Kyle. 2001. “Refusing the Devil’s Bargain: What Kind of Underdetermination Should We Take Seriously?”, in Philosophy of Science, Vol. 68, No. 3, September, pp. S1-S12. URI: http://www.jstor.org/stable/3080930
• Magnus, P. D. 2010. “Inductions, Red Herrings, and the Best Explanation for the Mixed Record of Science”, in The British Journal for the Philosophy of Science, Vol. 61, No. 4, December, pp. 803–819. URI: http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/bjps/axq004

Candidate Readings

• Sober, Elliott. 2011. “A Priori Causal Models of Natural Selection”, in Australasian Journal of Philosophy, Vol. 89, No. 4, pp. 571–589. URI: http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/00048402.2010.535006
• Lange, Marc and Rosenberg, Alexander. 2011. “Can There be A Priori Causal Models of Natural Selection?”, in Australasian Journal of Philosophy, Vol. 89, No. 4, pp. 591–599. URI: http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/00048402.2011.598175
• Loewer, Barry. 2012. “Two Accounts of Laws and Time”, in Philosophical Studies, Vol. 160, No. 1, August, pp. 115–137. URI: http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s11098-012-9911-x
• Lange, Marc. forthcoming. “Grounding, Scientific Explanation, and Humean Laws”, in Philosophical Studies. URI: http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s11098-012-0001-x
• Lyon, Aidan. 2012. “Mathematical Explanations Of Empirical Facts, And Mathematical Realism”, in Australasian Journal of Philosophy, Vol. 90, No. 3, pp. 559–578. URI: http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/00048402.2011.596216
• Saatsi, Juha. 2012. “Mathematics and Program Explanations”, in Australasian Journal of Philosophy, Vol. 90, No. 3, pp. 579–584. URI: http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/00048402.2012.665374