Science and Reason

Spring 2013

Lavoisier's experiment to analyze water (boiling in flask A) into its constituents of oxygen and hydrogen by passing the steam through a red-hot glass tube (EF) that contains spirals of beaten iron. The oxygen from the steam combines chemically with the glowing iron, while the released gaseous hydrogen is collected at left; scrupulous weighing verifies the equivalence of water and products. From Lavoisier's Traité élémentaire (1789). Image and caption from here.

Details

Instructors

Overview

This course is an introduction to the epistemological side of philosophy of science, focussing on questions concerning the nature of science. Epistemological questions in the philosophy of science are those concerning the nature of scientific knowledge: Is scientific knowledge different in principle from other forms of knowledge? If so, what makes it different? Should the history of science be seen as an ever-increasing advance of knowledge, or should we see the historical development of science in some other terms? Given that most scientific theories have turned out to be false, are we justified in believing that our current theories are true? We will examine these questions through readings drawn from both the history and philosophy of science.

Textbooks

The following textbook is mandatory. I have not ordered it into the bookstore, as second-hand copies should be very easy to find (see the link below):

Kuhn, Thomas S. The Structure of Scientific Revolutions, University Of Chicago Press, Chicago, 3^rd Ed, 1996. [AddAll]

Assessment

Requirements:

• Participation in class and online discussion.
• One 6–8 page research paper.
• One 8–10 page research paper.

The final grade will be determined as follows:

Assessment dates:

Paper guidelines [PDF]

Schedule

Lecture One (Wednesday 16 January)

Introductory Discussion: What is Science?

Section I: The Demarcation Problem

Lecture Two (Wednesday 23 January)

Introductory Reading
Hansson, Sven Ove. “Science and Pseudo-Science”, in Edward N. Zalta (Ed), Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, Stanford University, Stanford, 2008. [URI]

Primary Reading
Popper, Karl. 1963. “Science: Conjectures and Refutations”, in Conjectures and Refutations, Routledge, Kegan Paul, London, pp. 33–58. [PDF]

Sections §1–§3 are compulsory, the rest is optional.

Lecture Three (Monday 28 January)

Primary Reading
Kuhn, Thomas S. 1970. “Logic of Discovery or Psychology of Research?”, in Lakatos, Imre, and Alan Musgrave, Criticism and the Growth of Knowledge, Proceedings of the International Colloquium in the Philosophy of Science, Volume 4, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1970, pp. 1–22. [PDF]

Reprinted in Thomas S. Kuhn, The Essential Tension: Selected Studies in Scientific Tradition and Change, University of Chicago Press, Chicago, 1977, pp. 266–292; and in Schilpp, Paul Arthur, The Philosophy of Karl Popper, Library of Living Philosophers, Volume 14, Open Court, La Salle, pp. 798–819.

Secondary Reading
Popper, Karl. 1970. “Normal Science and its Dangers”, in Lakatos, Imre, and Alan Musgrave, Criticism and the Growth of Knowledge, Proceedings of the International Colloquium in the Philosophy of Science, Volume 4, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1970, pp. 51–58. [PDF]

Mayo, Deborah G. 1996. “Ducks, Rabbits, and Normal Science: Recasting the Kuhn's-Eye View of Popper's Demarcation of Science”, in The British Journal for the Philosophy of Science, Vol. 47, No. 2, June 1996, pp. 271–290. [URI]

No Class Wednesday 30 January

Lecture Four (Monday 4 February)

Primary Reading
Putnam, Hilary. 1974. “The ‘Corroboration’ of Theories”, in Paul Arthur Schilpp (Ed), The Philosophy of Karl Popper, Library of Living Philosophers, Vol. 14, Open Court, La Salle, pp. 221–240. [PDF]

Reprinted in Putnam, Hilary. 1975. Mathematics, Matter, and Method, Philosophical Papers, Vol. 1, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, pp. 250–269; and Boyd, Richard, Philip Gasper, and J. D. Trout (Eds). 1991. The Philosophy of Science, 3rd Edition, MIT Press, Cambridge MA, pp. 121–136; and Sklar, Lawrence. 2000. Bayesian and Non-Inductive Methods, The Philosophy of Science: A Collection of Essays, Vol. 5, Garland, Hamden CT, pp. 225–245.

Lecture Five (Wednesday 6 February)

Popper, Kuhn and Putnam, continued.

Lecture Six (Monday 11 February)

Primary Reading
Lakatos, Imre. 1974. “Science and Pseudoscience”, in Godfrey Vesey (Ed), Philosophy in the Open, Open University Press, 1974, pp. 96–102. [URI]

Reprinted in Imre Lakatos, The Methodology of Scientific Research Programmes, Philosophical Papers, Volume 1, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1977, pp. 1–7. This lecture is also available as an MP3, as delivered by Lakatos and originally broadcast on 30 June 1973.

Secondary Reading
Lakatos, Imre. 1970. “Falsification and the Methodology of Scientific Research Programmes”, in Lakatos, Imre, and Alan Musgrave, Criticism and the Growth of Knowledge, Proceedings of the International Colloquium in the Philosophy of Science, Volume 4, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1970, pp. 91–196. [PDF]

Worrall, John. 2003. “Normal Science and Dogmatism, Paradigms and Progress: Kuhn ‘versus’ Popper and Lakatos”, in Thomas Nickles, Thomas Kuhn, Contemporary Philosophy in Focus, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2003, pp. 65–100. [PDF]

Lecture Seven (Wednesday 13 February)

Primary Reading
Thagard, Paul R. 1978. “Why Astrology is a Pseudoscience”, in PSA: Proceedings of the Biennial Meeting of the Philosophy of Science Association, Volume One: Contributed Papers, 1978, pp. 223–234. [URI]

Secondary Reading
Thorndike, Lynn. 1955. “The True Place of Astrology in the History of Science”, in Isis, Vol. 46, No. 3, September 1955, pp. 273–278. [URI]

Lecture Eight (Monday 18 February)

Primary Reading
Laudan, Larry. 1983. “The Demise of the Demarcation Problem”, in Robert S. Cohen and Larry Laudan (Ed.), Physics, Philosophy and Psychoanalysis: Essays in Honor of Adolf Grünbaum, Boston Studies in the Philosophy of Science, Volume 76, Reidel, Dordrecht, pp. 111–127. [PDF]

Reprinted in Laudan, Larry, Beyond Positivism and Relativism: Theory, Method, and Evidence, Westview Press, Boulder CO, 1996, pp. 210–222; and in Michael Ruse and Robert T. Pennock (Eds), But is it Science? The Philosophical Question in the Creation/Evolution Controversy, Prometheus Books, Buffalo NY, 2nd Ed, 2008, pp. 312–330.

Secondary Reading
Gieryn, Thomas F. 1983. “Boundary-Work and the Demarcation of Science from Non-Science: Strains and Interests in Professional Ideologies of Scientists”, in American Sociological Review, Vol. 48, No. 6, December 1983, pp. 781–795. [URI]

Section II: Intelligent Design and the Demarcation Problem

Lecture Nine (Wednesday 20 February)

Primary Reading
Popper, Karl. 1974. “Darwinism as a Metaphysical Research Programme”, in Paul Arthur Schilpp (Ed), The Philosophy of Karl Popper, Library of Living Philosophers, Vol. 14, Open Court, La Salle, pp. 133–143. [PDF]

Reprinted in Balashov, Yuri and Alexander Rosenberg (Eds). 2002. Philosophy of Science: Contemporary Readings, Routledge, London, pp. 302–304; and in Michael Ruse and Robert T. Pennock (Eds), But is it Science? The Philosophical Question in the Creation/Evolution Controversy, Prometheus Books, Buffalo NY, 2nd Ed, 2008, pp. 105–115.

Kitcher, Philip. 1982. “Believing Where We Cannot Prove”, in Abusing Science: The Case Against Creationism, MIT Press, Cambridge MA, pp. 30–54. [PDF]

Secondary Reading
Kitcher, Philip. 1985. “Darwin's Achievement”, in Nicholas Rescher (Ed), Reason and Rationality in Natural Science, University Press of America, Lanham MD, pp. 127–189. [PDF]

Reprinted in The Advancement of Science: Science without Legend, Objectivity without Illusions, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 1993, pp. 11—57; In Mendel's Mirror: Philosophical Reflections on Biology, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2003, pp. 45–93; and in Marc Lange (Ed), Philosophy of Science: An Anthology, Blackwell, Malden MA, 2006, pp. 154—188.

Darwin, Charles. “Struggle for Existence” and “Natural Selection”, in On the Origin of Species by Means of Natural Selection, or the Preservation of Favoured Races in the Struggle for Life, John Murray, London, 1^st Ed, 1859, Chapters 3 and 4, pp. 60–79 and 80–130. [PDF]

Plutynski, Anya and Warren J. Ewens. “Population Genetics”, in Sahotra Sarkar and Jessica Pfeifer (Eds), The Philosophy of Science: An Encyclopedia, Routledge, New York, 2005, pp. 578–585. [PDF]

Multimedia
Listen, with slides, to Elliott Sober present an overview of Darwin's theory here. The paper on which this talk is based is:

Elliott Sober, “Did Darwin Write the Origin Backwards?”, in Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences, Vol. 106, Supplement 1, June 2009, pp. 10048–10055. [URI]

Lecture Ten (Monday 25 February)

Primary Reading
Michael J. Behe, “Irreducible Complexity: Obstacle to Darwinian Evolution”, in William A. Dembski and Michael Ruse (Eds), Debating Design: From Darwin to DNA, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2004, pp. 352–370. [PDF]

Reprinted in Rosenberg, Alexander and Robert Arp. 2010. Philosophy of Biology: An Anthology, Blackwell, Malden MA, pp. 427–438.

Multimedia
Watch Michael J. Behe present a talk on his argument from design at the conference “Interpreting Evolution: Scientific and Religious Perspectives” (Haverford, 17 June 2001) here.

Lecture Eleven (Wednesday 27 February)

Primary Reading
Kenneth R. Miller, “The Flagellum Unspun: The Collapse of “Irreducible Complexity””, in William A. Dembski and Michael Ruse (Eds), Debating Design: From Darwin to DNA, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2004, pp. 81–97. [PDF]

Reprinted in Rosenberg, Alexander and Robert Arp. 2010. Philosophy of Biology: An Anthology, Blackwell, Malden MA, pp. 439–449.

Secondary Reading
Liu, Renyi and Howard Ochman. 2007. “Stepwise Formation of the Bacterial Flagellar System”, in Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences, Vol. 104, No. 17, April 2007, pp. 7116–7121. [URI]

Multimedia
Watch Kenneth R. Miller present an overview of the evidence for evolution, criticise the argument from irreducible complexity, and endorse theistic evolutionism here.

Lecture Twelve (Monday 4 March)

Introductory Reading
Sober, Elliott. 2007. “What Is Wrong With Intelligent Design?”, in The Quarterly Review of Biology, Vol. 82, No. 1, March 2007, pp. 3–8. [PDF]

Reprinted in Michael Ruse and Robert T. Pennock (Eds), But is it Science? The Philosophical Question in the Creation/Evolution Controversy, Prometheus Books, Buffalo NY, 2nd Ed, 2008, pp. 495–505.

Primary Reading
Elliott Sober. 2003. “The Design Argument”, in Neil A. Manson (Ed), God and Design: The Teleological Argument and Modern Science, Routledge, London, pp. 25–53. [PDF]

Reprinted in William A. Dembski and Michael Ruse (Eds), Debating Design: From Darwin to DNA, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2004, pp. 98–129; and in Mann, William E (Ed). 2005. The Blackwell Guide to the Philosophy of Religion, Blackwell, Malden MA, pp. 117–147.

Lecture Thirteen (Wednesday 6 March)

Sober, continued.

Lecture Fourteen (Monday 18 March)

Primary Reading
Monton, Bradley. 2009. “Why It Is Legitimate to Treat Intelligent Design as Science”, in Seeking God in Science: An Atheist Defends Intelligent Design, Broadview, Peterborough ON, Chapter 2, pp. 47–74. [PDF]

Pennock, Robert. “Can't Philosophers Tell the Difference Between Science and Religion? Demarcation Revisited”, forthcoming in Synthese. [PDF]

Reprinted in Michael Ruse and Robert T. Pennock (Eds), But is it Science? The Philosophical Question in the Creation/Evolution Controversy, Prometheus Books, Buffalo NY, 2nd Ed, 2008.

Multimedia
For some of the background on this exchange, see the PBS documentary Judgment Day: Intelligent Design on Trial, available in full here.

Lecture Fifteen (Wednesday 20 March)

Monton and Pennock, continued.

Secondary Reading
Elliott Sober. 2007. “Intelligent Design Theory and the Supernatural—The “God or Extra-Terrestrials” Reply”, in Faith and Philosophy, Vol. 24, No. 1, January 2007, pp. 72–82. [PDF]

Section III: Conceptual Change

Lecture Sixteen (Monday 25 March)

Primary Reading
Kuhn, Thomas S. The Structure of Scientific Revolutions, University Of Chicago Press, Chicago, 3^rd Ed, 1996.

Sections I–IV, pp. 1–42.

Secondary Reading

Postscript, Sections 1–3, pp. 174–191.

Lecture Seventeen (Wednesday 27 March)

Primary Reading
Kuhn, Thomas S. The Structure of Scientific Revolutions, University Of Chicago Press, Chicago, 3^rd Ed, 1996.

Sections V–VIII, pp. 43–91.

Lecture Eighteen (Monday 1 April)

Primary Reading
Kuhn, Thomas S. The Structure of Scientific Revolutions, University Of Chicago Press, Chicago, 3^rd Ed, 1996.

Sections IX–X, pp. 92–135.

Lecture Nineteen (Wednesday 3 April)

Primary Reading
Kuhn, Thomas S. The Structure of Scientific Revolutions, University Of Chicago Press, Chicago, 3^rd Ed, 1996.

Section XI–XII, pp. 136–173.

Lecture Twenty (Monday 8 April)

Primary Reading
Kuhn, Thomas S. 1977. “Objectivity, Value Judgment, and Theory Choice”, in The Essential Tension: Selected Studies in Scientific Tradition and Change, University of Chicago Press, Chicago, 1977, pp. 320–339. [PDF]

Lecture Twenty One (Wednesday 10 April)

Primary Reading
Kitcher, Philip. 1978. “Theories, Theorists and Theoretical Change”, in The Philosophical Review, Vol. 87, No. 4, October 1978, pp. 519–547. [URI]

Secondary Reading
Kuhn, Thomas S. 1983. “Commensurability, Comparability, Communicability”, in Proceedings of the Biennial Meeting of the Philosophy of Science Association 1982, Vol. 2, pp. 669-688. [URI]

Reprinted in his The Road Since Structure: Philosophical Essays, James Conant and John Haugeland (Eds), University of Chicago Press, Chicago, 2000, pp. 669–688.

Kitcher, Philip. 1983. “Implications of Incommensurability”, in Proceedings of the Biennial Meeting of the Philosophy of Science Association 1982, Vol. 2, pp. 689-703. [URI]

Lecture Twenty Two (Monday 15 April)

Kitcher, continued.

Lecture Twenty Three (Wednesday 17 April)

Cancelled.

Lecture Twenty Four (Monday 22 April)

Cancelled.

Lecture Twenty Five (Wednesday 24 April)

Kitcher, continued.

Section IV: Realism and Anti-Realism

Lecture Twenty Six (Monday 29 April)

Laudan, Larry. 1981. “A Confutation of Convergent Realism”, in Philosophy of Science, Vol. 48, No. 1, March 1981, pp. 19–49. [URI]

Lecture Twenty Seven (Wednesday 1 May)

Lewis, Peter J. 2001. “Why The Pessimistic Induction Is A Fallacy”, in Synthese, Vol. 129, No. 3, December 2001, pp. 371–380. [PDF]

Updated: 25 April 2013