Philosophy of Science

Fall 2013


From Michael Faraday, Experimental Researches in Electricity

Michael Faraday's diagram of magnetic lines of force, from his “Experimental Researches in Electricity”, Philosophical Transactions of the Royal Society of London, Vol. 142, 1 January 1852, pp. 25–56.

Details | Instructor | Overview | Assessment | Schedule [ 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 | 6 | 7 | 8 | 9 | 10 | 11 | 12 | 13 | 14 | 15 | 16 | 17 | 18 | 19 | 20 | 21 | 22 | 23 | 24 | 25 | 26 | 27 ]

Details

Course CodesLocation Times
PHL 252, PHL 252W, PHL 452Morey Hall 502Mondays and Wednesdays, 12:30pm to 1:45pm

Instructor

NameEmailOfficeConsultation Times
Brad Weslakebradley.weslake@rochester.edu520 Lattimore HallMondays, 11AM–12PM

Overview

This is a survey course in general philosophy of science, focussing on metaphysical questions concerning the nature of science. Our questions: Do scientific explanations work because they tell us about laws, or because they tell us about causes, or for some other reason? How should we understand scientific laws? Do the laws of nature govern the world or simply encapsulate some interesting patterns in the world? What is the relationship between lower level and higher level laws, and between lower level and higher level scientific theories? The course may taken for upper level writing credit.

Assessment

Requirements:

The final grade will be determined approximately as follows:

Reading Summaries: 15%
First Research Paper: 35%
Second Research Paper: 50%

Note: Graduate students or students enrolled for upper level writing credit will be required to write longer papers. Graduate students will also be required to do additional reading and meet for an additional discussion section.

Due dates:

Reading Summaries: At each associated class, with no exceptions
First Paper: Wednesday 30 OctoberQuestions [PDF]
Second Paper: Monday 16 DecemberQuestions [PDF]

Paper guidelines [PDF]

Schedule

Introductory Discussion (Wednesday 4 September)

Section I: Explanation

Overview

Woodward, James. “Scientific Explanation”, in Edward N. Zalta (Ed), Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, Stanford University, Stanford, 2009. [URI]

Meeting Two (Monday 9 September)

Primary

Hempel, Carl Gustav. 1965. “Aspects of Scientific Explanation”, in Aspects of Scientific Explanation and Other Essays in the Philosophy of Science, Free Press, New York, pp. 331–496. [PDF]

Read Sections §1–§2.

Meeting Three (Wednesday 11 September)

Primary

Woodward, James. 2003. “Causal Explanation: Background and Criticism”, in Making Things Happen: A Theory of Causal Explanation, Oxford University Press, Oxford, pp. 152–186. [PDF]

Meeting Four (Monday 16 September)

Primary

Lewis, David. 1986. “Causal Explanation”, in Philosophical Papers, Vol. II, Oxford University Press, Oxford, pp. 214–240. [PDF]

Secondary

Skow, Brad. forthcoming. “Are There Non-Causal Explanations (of Particular Events)?”, in British Journal for the Philosophy of Science. [URI]

Meeting Five (Wednesday 18 September)

Woodward and Lewis, continued.

Meeting Six (Monday 23 September)

Primary

Sober, Elliott. 1983. “Equilibrium Explanation”, in Philosophical Studies, Vol. 43, No. 2, March 1983, pp. 201–210. [PDF]

Meeting Seven (Wednesday 25 September)

Primary

Kitcher, Philip. 1989. “Explanatory Unification and the Causal Structure of the World”, in Philip Kitcher and Wesley Salmon (Eds), Scientific Explanation, Minnesota Studies in the Philosophy of Science, Vol. 13, University of Minnesota Press, Minneapolis, pp. 410–505. [EXCERPTS PDF] [FULL PDF]

Excerpted in Balashov, Yuri and Alexander Rosenberg. 2002. Philosophy of Science: Contemporary Readings, Routledge, London, pp. 71–91. Excerpts are mandatory, full paper optional.

Meeting Eight (Monday 30 September)

Primary

Woodward, James. 2003. “The Causal Mechanical and Unificationist Models of Explanation”, in Making Things Happen: A Theory of Causal Explanation, Oxford University Press, Oxford, pp. 350–373. [PDF]

Read Sections §8.5–§8.11.

Meeting Nine (Wednesday 2 October)

Primary

Woodward, James and Hitchcock, Christopher. 2003. “Explanatory Generalizations, Part I: A Counterfactual Account”, in Noûs, Vol. 37, No. 1, March 2003, pp. 1–24. [URI]

No Class (Monday 7 October)

Meeting Ten (Wednesday 9 October)

Primary

Woodward, James and Hitchcock, Christopher. 2003. “Explanatory Generalizations, Part II: Plumbing Explanatory Depth”, in Noûs, Vol. 37, No. 2, June 2003, pp. 181–199. [URI]

Meeting Eleven (Monday 14 October)

Woodward and Hitchcock continued

Secondary

Jackson, Frank and Philip Pettit. 1992. “In Defense of Explanatory Ecumenism”, in Economics and Philosophy, Vol. 8, No. 1, April 1992, pp. 1–21. [PDF]

Reprinted in Jackson, Frank, Philip Pettit, and Michael Smith. 2004. Mind, Morality, and Explanation: Selected Collaborations, Oxford University Press, Oxford, pp. 163–186.

Meeting Twelve (Wednesday 16 October)

Primary

Weslake, Brad. 2010. “Explanatory Depth”, in Philosophy of Science, Vol. 77, No. 2, April 2010, pp. 273–294. [URI]

Secondary

Potochnik, Angela. 2010. “Levels of Explanation Reconceived”, in Philosophy of Science, Vol. 77, No. 1, January 2010, pp. 59–72. [URI]

Section II: Laws

Overview

Carroll, John W. “Laws of Nature”, in Edward N. Zalta (Ed), Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, Stanford University, Stanford, 2006. [URI]

Meeting Thirteen (Monday 21 October)

Primary

Cartwright, Nancy. 1994. “Fundamentalism vs. the Patchwork of Laws”, in Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Vol. 94, pp. 279–292. [URI]

Reprinted in Papineau, David (Ed). 1996. The Philosophy of Science, Oxford University Press, Oxford, pp. 314–326; and in Cartwright, Nancy. 1999. The Dappled World: A Study of the Boundaries of Science, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, pp. 23–34.

Meeting Fourteen (Wednesday 23 October)

Primary

Sklar, Lawrence. 2003. “Dappled Theories in a Uniform World”, in Philosophy of Science, Vol. 70, No. 2, April 2003, pp. 424–441. [URI]

Secondary

Hoefer, Carl. 2003. “For Fundamentalism”, in Philosophy of Science, Vol. 70, No. 5, December 2003, pp. 1401–1412. [URI]

Reprinted with a reply by Nancy Cartwright in Hartmann, Stephan, Carl Hoefer, and Luc Bovens (Eds). 2008. Nancy Cartwright's Philosophy of Science, Routledge, New York, pp. 307–323.

Meeting Fifteen (Monday 28 October)

Primary

Psillos, Stathis. 2002. “The Regularity View of Laws”, in Causation and Explanation, McGill-Queen's University Press, Montreal, 2002, pp. 137–158. [PDF]

Read Sections §5.1–§5.5.
Secondary

Roberts, John T. 2008. “The Law-Governed World-Picture”, in The Law-Governed Universe, Oxford University Press, Oxford, pp. 1–44. [PDF]

Read Sections §1.1–§1.6.

Meeting Sixteen (Wednesday 30 October)

Primary

Psillos, Stathis. 2002. “The Regularity View of Laws”, in Causation and Explanation, McGill-Queen's University Press, Montreal, 2002, pp. 137–158. [PDF]

Read Sections §5.6–§5.7.
Secondary

Loewer, Barry. 1996. “Humean Supervenience”, in Philosophical Topics, Vol. 24, No. 1, Spring 1996, pp. 101–127. [PDF]

Reprinted in Carroll, John W (Ed). 2004. Readings on Laws of Nature, University of Pittsburgh Press, Pittsburgh, pp. 176–206.

Meeting Seventeen (Monday 4 November)

Primary

Psillos, Stathis. 2002. “Laws as Relations Among Universals”, in Causation and Explanation, McGill-Queen's University Press, Montreal, 2002, pp. 159–177. [PDF]

Meeting Eighteen (Wednesday 6 November)

Primary

David M. Armstrong. 1983. “Laws of Nature as Relations Between Universals”, in What is a Law of Nature?, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, pp. 77–110. [PDF]

Meeting Nineteen (Monday 11 November)

Primary

Carroll, John W. 1990. “The Humean Tradition”, in The Philosophical Review, Vol. 99, No. 2, April 1990, pp. 185–219. [URI]

Meeting Twenty (Wednesday 13 November)

Primary

Beebee, Helen. 2000. “The Non-Governing Conception of Laws of Nature”, in Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, Vol. 61, No. 3, November 2000, pp. 571–594. [URI]

Reprinted in Carroll, John W (Ed). 2004. Readings on Laws of Nature, University of Pittsburgh Press, Pittsburgh, pp. 250–276.

Meeting Twenty One (Monday 18 November)

Carroll and Beebee continued. Listen to Beebee discuss laws of nature here: [MP3].

Meeting Twenty Two (Wednesday 20 November)

Primary

Maudlin, Tim. 2007. “A Modest Proposal Concerning Laws, Counterfactuals, and Explanations”, in The Metaphysics Within Physics, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2007, pp. 5–49. [PDF]

Meeting Twenty Three (Monday 25 November)

Primary

Tyler Hildebrand. 2013. “Can Primitive Laws Explain?”, in Philosophers’ Imprint, Vol. 13, No. 15, July 2013, pp. 1–15. [URI]

No Class (Wednesday 27 November)

Meeting Twenty Four (Monday 2 December)

Primary

Earman, John and John T. Roberts. 2005. “Contact with the Nomic: A Challenge for Deniers of Humean Supervenience about Laws of Nature Part II: The Epistemological Argument for Humean Supervenience”, in Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, Vol. 71, No. 2, September 2005, pp. 253–286. [URI]

Updated: 2 December 2013