Philosophy of Mind

Spring 2014

From Descarte's The World

Descartes explains how the eyes can focus on a nearby object. From Stephen Gaukroger (Ed), The World and Other Writings, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2004, p. 158.

Details

Course Codes	Location	Times
PHL 244, PHL 244W, PHL 444	Dewey Hall 2110D	Tuesdays and Thursdays, 12:30pm to 1:45pm

Instructor

Name	Email	Office	Consultation Times
Brad Weslake	bradley.weslake@rochester.edu	520 Lattimore	Wednesdays 11am–12pm, or by appointment

Overview

This course is an overview of the recent history of philosophy of mind, focusing on the relationship between the mind and the physical world. The aim is to trace through some of the central debates in this history, and to assess where we stand today. Topics covered include the question of how to formulate physicalism about the mind; an examination of behaviourism, the identity theory, and functionalist theories of the mind; the prospects for integrating consciousness and mental content within a physicalist worldview; and the problem of mental causation. The course may be taken for upper level writing credit.

Textbook

Kim, Jaegwon. 2010. Philosophy of Mind, Westview Press, Boulder CO. [AddAll] [Chapter 1] [Chapter 2]

The textbook will not be available in the campus bookstore. Note that the 3^rd Edition is required—make sure you do not buy the 1^st or 2^nd Editions.

Assessment

Requirements:

Fifteen 1–2 page weekly reading summaries.
Two 8–10 page research papers.

The final grade will be determined approximately as follows:

Reading Summaries:	15%
First Research Paper:	35%
Second Research Paper:	50%

Note: Graduate students or students enrolled for upper level writing credit will be required to write longer papers. Graduate students will also be required to do additional reading and meet for an additional discussion section.

Due dates:

Reading Summaries:	At each associated class, with no exceptions
First Paper:	Thursday 6 March	Questions [PDF]
Second Paper:	Friday 2 May	Questions [PDF]

Paper guidelines [PDF]

Schedule

Meeting One: Introductory Discussion (Thursday 16 January)

Secondary

Lycan, William G. 2003. “The Mind–Body Problem”, in Stich and Warfield (Ed), The Blackwell Guide to Philosophy of Mind, Blackwell, Malden MA, pp. 47–64. URI: http://goo.gl/xUzTNo.

Meeting Two: The Mark of The Mental (Tuesday 21 January)

Primary

Kim (2010, Chapter 1). URI: http://goo.gl/otZ9Ee

Secondary

Schwitzgebel, Eric. 2008. “The Unreliability of Naive Introspection”, in The Philosophical Review, Vol. 117, No. 2, April, pp. 245–273. URI: http://dx.doi.org/10.1215/00318108-2007-037.
Crane, Tim. 1998. “Intentionality as the Mark of the Mental”, in O’Hear (Ed), Current Issues in Philosophy of Mind, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, Vol. 43, pp. 229–252. URI: https://doi.org/10.1017/S1358246100004380.

Meeting Three: Defining Physicalism (Thursday 23 January)

Primary

Ney, Alyssa. 2008. “Defining Physicalism”, in Philosophy Compass, Vol. 3, No. 5, September, pp. 1033–1048. URI: http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1747-9991.2008.00163.x.

Secondary

Stoljar, Daniel. 2009. “Physicalism”, in Zalta (Ed), Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, Stanford University, Stanford. URI: http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/physicalism/, §§1–12.

Meeting Four: Epistemological Arguments for Dualism (Tuesday 28 January)

Primary

Kim (2010, Chapter 2, pp. 31–45). URI: http://goo.gl/zmZuy5

Meeting Five: Causal Arguments against Dualism (Thursday 30 January)

Primary

Kim (2010, Chapter 2, pp. 46–57). URI: http://goo.gl/zmZuy5

Secondary

Garber, Daniel. 1983. “Understanding Interaction: What Descartes Should Have Told Elisabeth”, in Southern Journal of Philosophy, Vol. 21, No. S1, pp. 15–32. URI: https://doi.org/10.1111/j.2041-6962.1983.tb01534.x.

No Class Tuesday 4 February

Meeting Six: Behaviourism (Thursday 6 February)

Primary

Kim (2010, Chapter 3).

Meeting Seven: Simplicity Arguments for The Identity Theory (Tuesday 11 February)

Primary

Kim (2010, Chapter 4, pp. 91–102).
Smart, J. J. C. 1959. “Sensations and Brain Processes”, in The Philosophical Review, Vol. 68, No. 2, April, pp. 141–156. URI: http://dx.doi.org/10.2307/2182164.

Meeting Eight: Causal Arguments for The Identity Theory (Thursday 13 February)

Primary

Kim (2010, Chapter 4, pp. 102–114).
Lewis, David. 1966. “An Argument for the Identity Theory”, in The Journal of Philosophy, Vol. 63, No. 1, January, pp. 17–25. URI: http://dx.doi.org/10.2307/2024524.

Meeting Nine: Multiple Realisation Arguments Against The Identity Theory (Tuesday 18 February)

Primary

Kim (2010, Chapter 4, pp. 114–127).
Putnam, Hilary. 1967. “Psychological Predicates”, in Capitan and Merrill (Ed), Art, Mind, and Religion, University of Pittsburgh Press, Pittsburgh, pp. 37–48. Reprinted as “The Nature of Mental States”. URI: http://goo.gl/dgzEw6

Secondary

Lewis, David. 1980. “Mad Pain and Martian Pain”, in Block (Ed), Readings in Philosophy of Psychology, Harvard University Press, Cambridge MA, Vol. 1, pp. 216–222. URI: http://goo.gl/4d6Xqv

Meeting Ten: Machine Functionalism (Thursday 20 February)

Primary

Kim (2010, Chapter 5, pp. 129–156).

Secondary

Piccinini, Gualtiero. 2010. “The Mind as Neural Software? Understanding Functionalism, Computationalism, and Computational Functionalism”, in Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, Vol. 81, No. 2, September, pp. 269–311. URI: http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1933-1592.2010.00356.x.

Meeting Eleven: The Chinese Room (Tuesday 25 February)

Primary

Kim (2010, Chapter 5, pp. 156–165).
Searle, John R. 1980. “Minds, Brains, and Programs”, in Behavioral and Brain Sciences, Vol. 3, No. 3, September, pp. 417–424. URI: http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/S0140525X00005756.

No Class Thursday 27 February

Meeting Twelve: More on Functionalism and The Chinese Room (Tuesday 4 March)

Primary

Kim (2010, Chapter 6).

Meeting Thirteen: Functionalism and Mental Causation (Thursday 6 March)

Primary

Block, Ned. 1990. “Can the Mind Change the World?”, in Boolos (Ed), Meaning and Method: Essays in Honor of Hilary Putnam, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, pp. 137–170. URI: http://goo.gl/23EE5M

Secondary

Rescorla, Michael. 2014. “The Causal Relevance of Content to Computation”, in Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, Vol. 88, No. 1, January, pp. 173–208. URI: http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1933-1592.2012.00619.x.

No Class Tuesday 11 March and Thursday 13 March

Meeting Fourteen: Anomalous Monism (Tuesday 18 March)

Primary

Kim (2010, Chapter 7, pp. 193–213).

Secondary

Woodward, James. 2003. “Causal Explanation: Background and Criticism”, in Making Things Happen: A Theory of Causal Explanation, Oxford University Press, New York, pp. 152–186. URI: http://goo.gl/PM8uqm.

Meeting Fifteen: The Exclusion Argument (Thursday 20 March)

Primary

Kim (2010, Chapter 7, pp. 214–219).

Secondary

Bennett, Karen. 2003. “Why the Exclusion Problem Seems Intractable, and How, Just Maybe, To Tract It”, in Noûs, Vol. 37, No. 3, September, pp. 471–497. URI: http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/1468-0068.00447.

Meeting Sixteen: More on The Exclusion Argument (Tuesday 25 March)

Primary

Kim (2010, Chapter 7, pp. 220–223).

Meeting Seventeen: Theories of Content (Thursday 27 March)

Primary

Kim (2010, Chapter 8, pp. 227–241).

Meeting Eighteen: Content Externalism (Tuesday 1 April)

Primary

Kim (2010, Chapter 8, pp. 241–254).

Secondary

Putnam, Hilary. 1975. “The Meaning of “Meaning””, in Gunderson (Ed), Language, Mind, and Knowledge, University of Minnesota Press, Minneapolis, Vol. 7, pp. 131–193. URI: http://goo.gl/7sU85k

Meeting Nineteen: Content Externalism and Mental Causation Thursday 3 April)

Primary

Kim (2010, Chapter 8, pp. 254–258).

Meeting Twenty: Science and Consciousness (Tuesday 8 April)

Primary

Kim (2010, Chapter 9, pp. 263–266).

Secondary

Dennett, Daniel C. 1988. “Quining Qualia”, in Marcel and Bisiach (Ed), Consciousness in Contemporary Science, Oxford University Press, Oxford, pp. 42–77. URI: http://goo.gl/E9FYXq

Meeting Twenty One: What Is It Like to be a Bat? (Thursday 10 April)

Primary

Kim (2010, Chapter 9, pp. 267–270).
Nagel, Thomas. 1974. “What Is It Like to Be a Bat?”, in The Philosophical Review, Vol. 83, No. 4, October, pp. 435–450. URI: http://dx.doi.org/10.2307/2183914.

No Class Tuesday Tuesday 15 April

Meeting Twenty Two: Can Science Tell Us What It Is Like to be a Bat? (Thursday 17 April)

Primary

Akins, Kathleen. 1993. “What Is It Like to Be Boring and Myopic?”, in Dahlbom (Ed), Dennett and His Critics: Demystifying Mind, Blackwell, Oxford, pp. 124–160. URI: http://goo.gl/hcXUoc

Meeting Twenty Three: Two Kinds of Consciousness (Tuesday 22 April)

Primary

Kim (2010, Chapter 9, pp. 271-280).

Secondary

Block, Ned. 1995. “On a Confusion About a Function of Consciousness”, in Behavioral and Brain Sciences, Vol. 18, No. 2, June, pp. 227–247. URI: http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/S0140525X00038188.

Meeting Twenty Four: Representationalism (Thursday 24 April)

Primary

Kim (2010, Chapter 9, pp. 281-295).
Harman, Gilbert. 1990. “The Intrinsic Quality of Experience”, in Philosophical Perspectives, Vol. 4, pp. 31–52. URI: http://dx.doi.org/10.2307/2214186.

Meeting Twenty Five: The Knowledge Argument (Tuesday 29 April)

Primary

Kim (2010, Chapter 10).
Jackson, Frank. 1982. “Epiphenomenal Qualia”, in The Philosophical Quarterly, Vol. 32, No. 127, April, pp. 127–136. URI: http://www.jstor.org/stable/2960077.

Updated: 18 April 2014