Fall 2014

Michael Faraday's diagram of magnetic lines of force, from his “Experimental Researches in Electricity”, Philosophical Transactions of the Royal Society of London, Vol. 142, 1 January 1852, pp. 25–56.

Details

Instructor

Overview

The course will cover three central topics in general philosophy of science: explanation, laws and causation. Topics may include: causal and non-causal theories of explanation; whether there are non-causal explanations of particular facts; the relationship between fundamental and non-fundamental explanations; theories of explanatory depth; whether fundamental laws have universal scope; Humean and non-Humean theories of laws; regularity and counterfactual theories of causation; causal models and their limitations.

Assessment

Requirements:

• Twelve 1–2 page weekly reading summaries.
• One research paper.

Due dates:

Schedule

Meeting One: Introductory Discussion (Friday 5 September)

Section I: Explanation

Meeting Two: Nomological Theories of Explanation (Friday 12 September)

• Hempel, Carl Gustav. 1965. “Aspects of Scientific Explanation”, in Aspects of Scientific Explanation and Other Essays in the Philosophy of Science, Free Press, New York, pp. 331–496. URI: http://goo.gl/UqV54C (Read §§1–2)
• Woodward, James. 2003. “Causal Explanation: Background and Criticism”, in Making Things Happen: A Theory of Causal Explanation, Oxford University Press, New York, pp. 152–186. URI: https://doi.org/10.1093/0195155270.003.0004. URI: http://goo.gl/qaAneX

Meeting Three: Causal Theories of Explanation (Friday 19 September)

• Lewis, David. 1986. “Causal Explanation”, in Philosophical Papers, Oxford University Press, Oxford, Vol. II, pp. 214–240. URI: http://doi.org/10.1093/0195036468.003.0007. URI: http://goo.gl/kavvu3
• Sober, Elliott. 1983. “Equilibrium Explanation”, in Philosophical Studies, Vol. 43, No. 2, March, pp. 201–210. URI: http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/BF00372383.
• Skow, Brad. 2014. “Are There Non-Causal Explanations (of Particular Events)?”, in British Journal for the Philosophy of Science, Vol. 65, No. 3, September, pp. 445–467. URI: http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/bjps/axs047.

Meeting Four: Counterfactual Theories of Explanation (Friday 26 September)

• Woodward, James and Hitchcock, Christopher. 2003. “Explanatory Generalizations, Part I: A Counterfactual Account”, in Noûs, Vol. 37, No. 1, March, pp. 1–24. URI: http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/1468-0068.00426.
• Woodward, James and Hitchcock, Christopher. 2003. “Explanatory Generalizations, Part II: Plumbing Explanatory Depth”, in Noûs, Vol. 37, No. 2, June, pp. 181–199. URI: http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/1468-0068.00435.
• Skow, Brad. 2014. “An Evaluation of Woodward’s Theory of Causal Explanation”. Unpublished manuscript. URI: http://goo.gl/iMRzQc

Meeting Five: Theories of Explanatory Depth (Friday 3 October)

• Weslake, Brad. 2010. “Explanatory Depth”, in Philosophy of Science, Vol. 77, No. 2, April, pp. 273–294. URI: http://dx.doi.org/10.1086/651316.
• Franklin-Hall, Laura. forthcoming. “High-Level Explanation and the Interventionist’s ‘Variables Problem’”, in British Journal for the Philosophy of Science. URI: http://goo.gl/ZkN2pw

Section II: Laws

Meeting Six: Nomic Fundamentalism (Friday 10 October)

• Cartwright, Nancy. 1994. “Fundamentalism vs. the Patchwork of Laws”, in Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Vol. 94, No. 1, June, pp. 279–292. URI: https://doi.org/10.1093/aristotelian/94.1.279.
• Sklar, Lawrence. 2003. “Dappled Theories in a Uniform World”, in Philosophy of Science, Vol. 70, No. 2, April, pp. 424–441. URI: http://dx.doi.org/10.1086/375476.

Meeting Seven: Humean Theories of Laws (Friday 17 October)

• Loewer, Barry. 1996. “Humean Supervenience”, in Philosophical Topics, Vol. 24, No. 1, pp. 101–127. URI: http://goo.gl/lyeH6d
• Hall, Ned. 2009. “Humean Reductionism About Laws of Nature”. Unpublished manuscript..

Optional Meeting: Strevens on Explanation (Tuesday 21 October, 1–3pm)

• Strevens, Michael. 2004. “The Causal and Unification Approaches to Explanation Unified—Causally”, in Noûs, Vol. 38, No. 1, March, pp. 154–176. URI: http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1468-0068.2004.00466.x.
• Strevens, Michael. 2013. “No Understanding without Explanation”, in Studies in History and Philosophy of Science, Vol. 44, No. 3, September, pp. 510–515. URI: http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.shpsa.2012.12.005.
• Extracts from Depth:
  • On equilibrium explanation: http://goo.gl/GXf0Iw
  • On abstraction: http://goo.gl/Wh1yiu
  • A fuller presentation of the kairetic account (optional): http://goo.gl/QQC2jZ

No Class Friday 24 October

Meeting Eight: Primitivist Theories of Laws (Friday 31 October)

• Maudlin, Tim. 2007. “A Modest Proposal Concerning Laws, Counterfactuals, and Explanations”, in The Metaphysics Within Physics, Oxford University Press, Oxford, pp. 5–49. URI: http://doi.org/10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199218219.003.0002. URI: http://goo.gl/LGgTCp
• Hildebrand, Tyler. 2013. “Can Primitive Laws Explain?”, in Philosophers’ Imprint, Vol. 13, No. 15, July, pp. 1–15. URI: http://hdl.handle.net/2027/spo.3521354.0013.015.

Section III: Causation

Meeting Nine: Methodology (Friday 7 November)

• Hall, Ned and Paul, L. A. 2013. Causation: A User’s Guide, Oxford University Press, Oxford, §§1–2.

Meeting Ten: Preemption (Friday 14 November)

• Hall, Ned and Paul, L. A. 2013. Causation: A User’s Guide, Oxford University Press, Oxford, §§3.1–3.4.

No Classes Friday 21 November and Friday 28 November

Meeting Eleven: Overdetermination and Omissions (Friday 5 December)

• Hall, Ned and Paul, L. A. 2013. Causation: A User’s Guide, Oxford University Press, Oxford, §§3.5–4.5.

Meeting Twelve: Transitivity (Friday 12 December)

• Hall, Ned and Paul, L. A. 2013. Causation: A User’s Guide, Oxford University Press, Oxford, §§5–6.

Updated: 5 November 2014